

THE *Nation*

March 19, 1949



Pros and Cons

BY WALTER MILLIS, JAMES P. WARBURG,
BLAIR BOLLES, CLARK M. EICHELBERGER,
AND J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

✱

Our House of Lords

The Disgrace of the Filibuster

BY THOMAS SANCTON

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THE *Nation*

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NUMBER 12

The Shape of Things

THIS WEEK *THE NATION* PRESENTS A GROUP of articles which form, we think, a valuable contribution to the most important issue now before the country—the North Atlantic Pact. Publication of the final draft of the agreement, promised for the end of this week, will make possible a more detailed and perhaps more pointed analysis, but comment obviously could not wait upon the official text. In every country newspapers and political leaders have had to formulate their attitudes on the basis of the broad outlines of the pact as revealed in the various foreign offices; and that is what the four contributors to this issue have done. To facilitate negotiation, secrecy may have seemed useful. In terms of an informed public opinion it was deplorable, and the uneasiness it created was intensified by the air of desperate urgency in Washington. Military experts in and out of the services agree that Russia has no intention of precipitating a hot war in the discernible future. So the State Department's feverish efforts to whip the pact into shape, its pressure on the Scandinavians, have had the undesired effect of seeming to justify both Soviet fears of "imperialist aggression" and a suspicion among some Western leaders that their countries, though not in danger of attack, were being prepared to serve as the staging-area for a preventive war. These apprehensions, generally minimized in the United States, are sampled and summarized by Mr. del Vayo on page 334. It is important for Americans to know of the extent of this feeling. Otherwise the violent tactics of the Communists and their close allies are likely to drown out the opposition more soberly expressed in other quarters.

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THE CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE ASK many of the questions which must trouble the minds of thinking Americans as they consider the implications of the proposed alliance. Without minimizing the dangers of the continuing conflict with Russia, without challenging the need of some kind of concerted policy in the West—Walter Millis, indeed, strongly favors the pact as the only possible answer to the threat of Soviet power—these authors critically evaluate the agreement as a means of achieving its purported aim. We urge our readers to study them with care, directing attention to the specific amendments suggested by

James P. Warburg. The one important question which none of these articles raises directly, but which is mentioned on Del Vayo's page, is the wisdom of including in the alliance countries whose strategic position offers a direct threat to Russian security—countries such as Norway, Iceland, and, to a lesser degree, Italy. Both Walter Lippmann and John Foster Dulles have pointed out the dangers of this policy; clearly it deserves careful consideration. In later issues we hope to print one or two articles by Europeans and further editorial comment, and we invite comments from readers. Even in its "final" form the pact must be regarded as a draft, subject to full public debate and to amendment by the Senate in accordance with the wishes of the people.

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THE KIND OF DEMOCRACY WHICH THE United States is trying to sell Europe via the Atlantic Pact was revealed with startling clarity last Saturday when the recently appointed Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, placed the United States squarely in the pro-Franco column and against the United Nations resolution of 1946. In sharp contrast to Dean Rusk's statement are the views expressed by Harold L. Ickes, former Secretary of the Interior, in the *New York Post* on the same day. Unlike Mr. Rusk, Mr. Ickes may be said to have contributed to Mr. Truman's election. Mr. Ickes's views are truly expressive of the feelings of American liberals. We ask the leaders of the labor unions and all progressive organizations in the United States and those individuals who voted for Mr. Truman to insist that the whitewashing of Franco Spain is not the foreign policy for which they voted.

★

EVEN THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT REQUIRES an employer to bargain in good faith. Cardinal Spellman, who talks a great deal about good Americanism, should read the act, particularly Section 8. He would find that he had no sanction in law for demanding that his striking cemetery workers leave the union of their choice; much less for insisting that they return to work as individuals, after which he would negotiate with them and graciously permit them to form another union. Not since the heyday of Remington-Rand and Republic Steel has any employer had the audacity to proclaim in public, as the Cardinal is reported to have done: "I admit to the accusation of strike-breaker, and I am proud of it. If stopping a strike like this isn't a thing of honor, then

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I don't know what honor is." If employers are to have the right to pass on whether or not a strike is honorable, there will obviously be no strikes, and no unions either. Putting together some of the comments made by the Cardinal in the course of this affair, it is easy to believe that he would view such an arrangement with equanimity. Unable to brand the strikers themselves as Communists—1,045 of the local's 1,100 members are Catholic—he found that their tactics were "certainly communistic." But their only tactics were to resort to a very peaceful strike—with pickets doffing their hats to the Cardinal out of respect for his office as he led a detail of seminary students, equipped with pick and shovel, to take over their jobs. The inference, then, is that striking itself is communistic. "This has been the most important thing which I have had to do in the ten years I have been in New York," the Cardinal told the press. It may well turn out to have been the most far-reaching. The strike has ended. But it will be a long time until labor forgets that the Cardinal's co-religionists were forced to condemn "the strike-busting tactics of any employer, including the Catholic church when it acts as an employer." And it is most significant that during the conflict the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists rallied to the strikers' support.

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THE VINDICATION OF MIRIAM VAN WATERS and her reinstatement as head of the Massachusetts Reformatory for Women have ended a case whose implications reached far beyond the question of justice to a devoted public official. Dr. Van Waters is one of a handful of progressive penologists directing institutions in this country (see *Bridewell Revisited* by Edwin J. Lukas, in *The Nation*, February 12). The impartial board appointed by Governor Dever to review the case reversed her suspension by the Commissioner of Correction in a decision described by the *Boston Globe* as "scholarly yet biting." Headed by Dean Griswold of the Harvard Law School, the board disposed of the main charges against her one by one and criticized the conduct of the previous hearings, which had confirmed her dismissal. Nine of the charges were described as "trivial and, indeed, captious." What will follow Dr. Van Waters's exoneration is uncertain. The Commissioner insists that he has no intention of resigning. Several of his political friends threaten a fight against what they call "a vicious miscarriage of justice." But the general feeling in Boston is that the decision of the Governor's board opens the way for early legislation to modernize the archaic rules of the Women's Reformatory and to establish more advanced penological methods throughout the state. This prospect is particularly hopeful in view of the fact that Dr. Van Waters was warmly supported by important members of the Roman Catholic Church as well as of other denominations in Massachusetts.

SENATOR JOHN W. BRICKER OF OHIO, THAT ardent liberal, has threatened to offer on the Senate floor an anti-discrimination amendment to the impending national housing bill. If he does, he will doubtless receive the backing of the noted progressive, Senator Harry P. Cain of Washington. For it was the Bricker-Cain team that tried to attach an anti-discrimination clause to the bill before it left the Banking Committee. Their motives, of course, are of the purest: all they want to do is undermine, for the third time, the federal housing program which they have fought so fiercely through two previous sessions of Congress. Their recommendation, despite its intrinsic merit, is plainly a tactical maneuver designed to deprive the present bill of Southern Democratic backing, without which it probably cannot pass. Although some real liberals like Walter White are urging support of the Bricker-Cain proposal, even if it means that the housing program once again goes under, we find more sense in the opposing arguments of housing experts like Charles Abrams. Public housing, Mr. Abrams contends, can be one of the most important seed beds of racial harmony; and while projects in some communities may be discriminatory, those in cities like New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and elsewhere will not be Jim Crow and will continue to set an example for public—and private—projects elsewhere. But to defeat the public-housing program now is to leave housing to the private builders and thus freeze, for years to come, the Jim Crow pattern they invariably prefer until they are shown that democratic housing pays cash dividends as well as social dividends. (N. B. Bricker and Cain, it should be noted, are among the Republicans who last Friday voted against Vice-President Barkley's ruling on cloture and thus, as Thomas Sancton makes clear on page 322, against civil rights for Negroes).

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A TALL BOURBON AND SODA, SERVED WITH the window shades up, marked the end of an era last week as Governor Frank Carlson of Kansas signed the liquor-control bill that ended sixty-nine years of prohibition in his state. America's noble experiment originated in Kansas in 1880. When the nation abandoned prohibition in 1933, Kansas voted to remain dry, and continued to vote that way until the veterans of World War II helped carry the day for repeal last November. Now, after eight weeks of wrangling, the legislature has produced the "Carlson plan" for liquor distribution. By early summer, after enforcement machinery is set up, privately owned liquor stores will be opened in the towns that elect to have them. Liberals in the legislature had argued that the liquor business, with its great effect on the welfare and morals of the people, should not be left to the exploitation of private capital. Many dries supported this position, but Governor Carlson opposed it

and several legislators branded it "socialism" and likened it to state medicine. Behind the scenes, of course, the big money of big liquor made its weight felt. Still, repeal has brought new promise for Kansas. Prohibition was the great smoke screen, released each election year to obscure the state's very real economic and social shortcomings. It made a campaign platform of the pulpit and measured candidates solely by their moisture content. With it gone, Kansans may at last have a chance to turn their thoughts to their shortages of schools, mental hospitals, and doctors, and their questionable record in civil rights.

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WE WOULD BE THE FIRST TO ACKNOWLEDGE that a generation of Americans has been driven several degrees toward illiteracy by the "comic" book. And it is appalling that 60,000,000 comic books are sold in this country every month. This being granted, however, we must put ourselves on record against the current nationwide drive to liquidate the comic book through censorship—a drive which last month resulted in the approval of the Feinberg comic-book censorship act by the New York State Assembly. Morris Ernst of the American Civil Liberties Union has termed the bill "a direct threat to the freedom of the press." "If it were constitutional," he adds, "which it is not, every daily newspaper could be brought under it." In addition, the bill is unnecessary. The legislators at Albany, as in some fourteen states and countless cities where similar action is now pending, know very well that existing federal, state, and municipal laws—especially postal laws—can be invoked to prevent the distribution of obscene or otherwise objectionable matter. And the present crusade, in fact, has been dismissed by competent psychiatrists as "much ado about nothing," or, more exactly, as an effort by guilt-stricken parents to find a scapegoat for their own failure to educate their children for a healthy maturity. The most disturbing aspect of the clean-up is the zeal with which in certain towns church leaders and professional censors have taken command. Comic books are an opening wedge. If they can be "purified"—that is, controlled—newspapers, periodicals, books, films, and everything else will follow.

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DICTATOR PERON CARRIED OUT HIS SECOND successful coup d'état last week, this time a "constitutional" one. While protesting on every possible occasion that he would not succeed himself when his term ended, he generously permitted his friends to shove through an amendment to the constitution eliminating the provision which forbids reelection. The opposition took the only course open to it, withdrawing from the Parliament before the vote was taken. With the opposition out, the remaining deputies cast a "unanimous" vote for the re-

vision. Americans who with good cause denounced the Czech Communists last year when to alter the Constitution they summoned a Parliament from which opposition had been effectively excluded have a similar opportunity for indignation in Argentina. Perón has arranged for the "legal" perpetuation of his power in the face of considerable political unrest, especially in the army, and of an increasing economic crisis. American business men returning from Argentina report steadily worsening conditions. Argentina's desperate need of dollars has also affected Spain, by preventing fulfilment of the trade agreement between Buenos Aires and Madrid. Confronted with similar crises, the two Spanish-speaking dictators seek a solution of their difficulties in the common strategy of suppressing opposition and seeking loans. Word that President Truman had agreed to lend money to Argentina circulated in Washington last week. At the same time Madrid quoted "an American source" as saying that the United States was considering a loan to Franco to prevent the total collapse of his regime, adding that this move "would be part of the program for keeping communism out of Europe." We hope both stories are met with a prompt official denial.

★

DR. JAMES W. FIFIELD, JR., PASTOR OF THE First Congregational Church of Los Angeles, the world's largest Congregational church, is fighting mad these days. (Dr. Fifield's Spiritual Mobilization movement was described by Carey McWilliams in *The Nation* for February 7, 1948.) Prone to see "statism" and "collectivism" wherever he looks, he is at present aroused by the threat to freedom offered by President Truman's medical and public-health program. In a news letter dated February 9 Dr. Fifield as director of Spiritual Mobilization and Dr. Donald J. Cowling, chairman of the board of Spiritual Mobilization, charge that this program is worse than socialism; it is Leninism. Should it be enacted, asks Dr. Fifield, "what would happen to birth control, faith-healing, abortion, the Christian concept of the home in contrast with 'baby crop quotas'?" "Political medicine," he ominously notes, has fostered in other countries the view that "women are just breeding creatures." His denunciation, like most of his political diatribes, seems somewhat confused. If the program sanctioned birth control and abortions, would it also stimulate "baby crop quotas" and make of women "just breeding creatures"? Is Dr. Fifield against birth control and baby crop quotas? Only a "mortal-God-pagan state," according to Dr. Fifield, would sponsor a program of this character and the "next one hundred days may decide freedom's future." In view of the clear political tenor of this latest action letter, one can only wonder how much longer Spiritual Mobilization will continue to enjoy tax exempt status.

Magazine Death Ray

FOR seventy years American periodicals and their readers have been enjoying the benefits of government subsidy in the form of low-cost mailing rates. If Congress yields to the request of the Post Office Department, that subsidy will be all but eliminated. So will some of the periodicals—50 per cent of the country's magazines, in the opinion of T. F. Mueller, publisher of *Newsweek*.

Mr. Mueller's view may be somewhat hysterical, but the rate-raising bill, now before the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, is causing something very like a panic in publishing offices from the *Reader's Digest* to the *Poultry Tribune*. The *Digest*, often hailed as the most successful magazine venture in publishing history, maintains that had the proposed rates been operative in 1948, it would have lost a million dollars on the year's operations. The *Wall Street Journal* devoted a front-page story last week to the reported effect of the requested increase in second-class rates, and the figures it cited, if accurate, are impressive. The *Saturday Evening Post*, for example, would cost its subscribers ten dollars a year instead of six. If the increase were not passed along, the Curtis Publishing Company would find itself paying out an additional \$15,000,000 a year, for all its magazines, as against net earnings in 1948 of \$5,500,000. *Pathfinder* and the *Farm Journal*, relying heavily on mail distribution, would find their combined postage bill increased from \$740,000 to \$3,660,000. And the National Grange monthly might be put out of business.

Allowing for possible exaggeration, there is no doubt that the Post Office bill would gravely affect every type of periodical. It would wipe out the legitimate postage differential between advertising and editorial matter for periodicals with less than 25 per cent advertising; it would end the free delivery of country papers within the county of publication—with sad consequences for journals like William Allen White's *Emporia Gazette*; and it would impose on publications carrying more than 25 per cent of advertising a surcharge applicable to their total content, advertising and editorial alike.

The sole purpose of the measure is to compel users of second-class mail to contribute toward the elimination of a predicted deficit of \$400,000,000 in the operation of the Post Office Department. To look upon the services of that agency as a paying business, however, is to nullify a century-old concept—namely, that the cheap and efficient dissemination of the printed word is a social service undertaken by government in the same way that it performs services for the farmer, the wage-earner, and the business man through the operations of the Agriculture, Labor, and Commerce Departments. The expenditures of those agencies are regarded rightly as appropriate.

tions for the public welfare, and there is no thought of exacting payment for their numerous services in order to eliminate "deficits." It was on the basis of the public-service concept that Congress established the system of second-class mailing privileges in the Postal Act of 1879, and it has consistently granted preferential treatment to newspapers and periodicals ever since.

Now along comes Postmaster General Donaldson with the blandly stated belief that his department "should be operated as a business institution," with nicely balanced books and a "deficit" only for those services which it performs for the government itself. It is ironic, of course, that this theory, normally so dear to the hearts of some of our journalistic contemporaries, should exact from them such cries of anguish now that it has struck home. It is a little shocking to learn that the *Reader's Digest*, that cheery little champion of earnest self-help, depends for its profits on a government subsidy. And it is almost embarrassing to hear the president of the Hearst Corporation invoke government aid "to second-class mail users because they provide information which is important to adult education." Gone is the fear of socialism, gone the concern for that rugged individualism that made the country great, etc., etc. As inveterate believers in the obligation of government to fill the gaps in a profit economy, we welcome our colleagues into the light. Perhaps they will join us in the belief that government may properly concern itself with houses and medical care, as well as adult education by way of the *Cosmopolitan*, the *Nation*, and the *Saturday Evening Post*.

POLITICS and PEOPLE

BY ROBERT BENDINER

Notes Not in the News

IT MAY pain the dogmatists to admit it, but, except for the Communists, ideological groupings in the United States are still pretty fluid. Last week, for example, Father Charles Owen Rice, who conducts a column called *The Condition of Labor in the Pittsburgh Catholic*, turned his attention to the case of Dr. Bryn Hovde, who would surely have been president of Queens College by now if Mayor O'Dwyer hadn't made the gaffe of intervening under pressure. "Hovde is a splendid fellow," wrote the Pittsburgh priest. "It is shocking that he is the victim of a smear campaign, which is all it is. . . . Then there is the Eighth Commandment—Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor. That applies to everyone, even those living in Brooklyn." This was almost the unkindest cut of all, since Brooklyn's only connection with the affair is through the Brooklyn *Tablet*, organ of the Catholic archdiocese, which has

been spearheading the fight against Dr. Hovde. I say "almost" because Father Rice's conclusion is even more deadly: "One of the charges against Hovde is his hostility to Franco. Sure Hovde was, and is, hostile to the little Caudillo. So was virtually every other non-Catholic in the United States, and many Catholics."

At the same time we have Senator James E. Murray, long regarded as a champion of liberalism, inserting in the *Congressional Record* "a speech delivered by my good friend, Dr. Joseph F. Thorning." An indefatigable propagandist for Franco throughout the civil war, Dr. Thorning is still at it. The speech on which Senator Murray has bestowed his accolade, not to mention free passage through the mails, is studded with tributes to the Caudillo for having "furnished solid protection to our flank when our brave soldiers, sailors, and marines made their initial onslaught on the enemy . . . an hour in United States history when a friend in need was a friend indeed."

To complete a freakish triangle I offer the performance of Senator Burnet R. Maybank, of South Carolina, as conservative as Murray is liberal and as anti-Communist as they come, even in Dixie. Maybank's choice for insertion in the *Congressional Record* on the day that Dr. Thorning's exhortation appeared was a joint statement by the Baptist ministers of Charleston. The burden of this missive was that agitation over the Mindszenty trial was needlessly pushing us in the direction of a war with Hungary, and that Cardinal Spellman and President Truman were wrong "to inject into a civil trial the concept of immunity from justice because of the religious position of the one being tried." Senator Maybank's constituents also threw in some rather pointed allusions to the lack of religious freedom in Spain, "where none but Catholics are allowed to hold public services and private services are threatened with violence." The introduction of "religious pressure" into the case, the pastors thought, was "un-American and dangerous beyond estimation."

* * *

Even Communists, once they are free of the party traces, may be found wandering down unexpected by-paths. Earl Browder, who still regards himself as a true believer and defender of the faith, considers the November elections "a defeat for the American war party and a mandate for peace," *Pravda* to the contrary notwithstanding. The forgotten comrade has been addressing meetings of a group, numbering about sixty persons and called the "Discussion Circle," which meets monthly in various New York hotels. At a recent session of the circle Browder analyzed the "Miracle of November 2" as follows: Truman, whose basic motivation from the start was a desire to be elected in his own right, attempted at first to pursue the Roosevelt foreign policy. For that reason he gave Wallace the green light on his

famous Madison Square Garden speech. What caused him to switch tracks was the half-forgotten fact that the Communists, misled by Foster and company, booed Wallace on that occasion. The President was thereupon convinced that he could not safely pursue a left-of-center course, since he could not rely on left support. Hence the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

During the campaign, the Browder analysis runs, Mr. Truman realized that he was not quite making the grade. Something was missing. With his native shrewdness he soon came to the conclusion that it was the bi-partisan foreign policy that was the stumbling-block. A prisoner of that policy, he could sympathize with Stalin, whom he supposed to be a prisoner of the Politburo. He sympathized out loud when he referred in a speech to "good

old Joe"—and from that moment victory was his. "An electric thrill went through the country," and all that was needed was a concrete act to pin the election down. Hence the proposed Vinson mission—and triumph at the polls.

I wonder if this novel thesis—in the course of which, by the way, Mr. Browder shrewdly demolishes the Progressive Party's role in the campaign—would have been put forward if the Vinson mission had actually taken place. From sources rather closer to the President than Earl Browder I gather that the Chief Justice's errand was not at all intended to conciliate "good old Joe," but rather to warn him that the fever chart over here was on the rise, with consequences that the Soviet leaders would ignore only at their peril.

Our House of Lords

BY THOMAS SANCTON

Washington, March 13

THE Senate's prolonged debate on the rules of debate, which resulted this week in a forty-six to forty-one vote against the Truman Administration and indirectly against its civil-rights program, has been one of the most disgraceful political episodes in American history. Men of the stature of Arthur H. Vandenberg, whose names are identified throughout the world with the pledges and protestations of Western democracy, have wallowed in political hypocrisy and fatuity. A score of Senators in a coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats have spoken hundreds of thousands of words which are a travesty upon the very concepts of "freedom," "democracy," and "the rights of a [Senatorial] minority" of which they spout.

As a result of the vote which defeated Vice-President Barkley's effort to break the filibuster, the civil-rights program, and much of President Truman's economic and welfare legislation besides, will probably be crushed. In addition, the Senate's performance is undoubtedly creating effective propaganda material for Communists round the world. The elections of last November proved to the world and to ourselves that a candidate with a progressive program could win against the full weight of the reactionary press supplemented by major political treachery. This accomplishment is now being largely vitiated in the Senate. Although the Republican as well as the Democratic Party is committed to the passage of civil-rights legislation, a majority of the Republican Senators have joined with the Southern Democrats to prevent passage of the civil-rights bills and to take the first steps toward wrecking the entire Fair Deal program.

As I write, there is still a possibility that President Truman will order his lieutenants to hold the Senate in continuous session, thus forcing the filibusterers to talk to exhaustion. If he does, a vote could then be taken on the actual matter now at issue, a change of Senate rules, and under these new circumstances the Republicans would be deprived of the screen of parliamentary complexities that until now has partially covered their dishonorable sabotage of civil rights. By fighting the filibusterers to exhaustion, President Truman might turn the present serious defeat into a sensational victory. To do so, however, would require of Truman's Senate leaders a resolution equal to that of the filibusterers, and there is grave doubt whether they have it. This sort of contest, of course, is made to order for a man of Mr. Truman's determined temperament, but in conducting it he must rely on men like Majority Leader Scott Lucas, who has pursued a weak and vacillating course. After their defeat in Friday's vote the Administration leaders immediately began to consider possible compromises—sordid compromises which at this moment look very much in the making.

If the filibuster is fought to a finish, it will only be through the anger and determination of the President himself. Some Southern Senators have actually taunted the Democratic leadership by asserting that it could beat a filibuster if it were resolved to do so. The Republican minority leader, Senator Wherry of Nebraska—who voted with the Southerners to override Barkley though he is himself coauthor of the very debate-limiting resolution now before the chamber—has justified this act of dazzling hypocrisy by claiming that he wants

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to prove the Administration position a "phony" one. Senator Vandenberg, adopting a more resounding but no less contemptible line of reasoning, joined in this process of sabotage. Senator Taft did not join openly and voted to uphold Barkley's ruling. But Taft significantly refrained from making a speech in defense of his position, by which he might have restrained some or all of the Republicans who went over to the Dixiecrats as a result of Vandenberg's speech. Walter White of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, who worked to stiffen support of the Truman program, said after Vandenberg spoke, "Mr. Vandenberg has cost us from five to seven votes. He has given an aura of respectability to those who wanted an excuse to vote to upset Mr. Barkley."

It is to be recorded to the lasting credit of Senator Hubert Humphrey, who is sometimes accused of liberal "glibness," that he made the same courageous fight at the Democratic caucus which followed the Barkley defeat as he had made at the Philadelphia convention. Humphrey demanded that the regular party fight it out with the filibusterers to the end. If it should do so, and win, this will be the second time Humphrey has helped salvage it from a political fiasco.

IT IS hard to believe that grown men of sufficient intelligence and seriousness to be elected to the United States Senate can delude themselves into believing that their own ultimate interests—to say nothing of the nation's and of democracy's itself—are being served by the demonstration we have seen. The thing is ugly to the point of obscenity. In one of the gravest periods ever faced by a government predicated upon freedom of the individual, legislation of epochal importance is being decided by how long old men can speak without dropping—or without lapsing from weariness into a pathological senility, as has already been observed on the Senate floor at least once. Or by how long younger and more durable men can mumble mere words, and go without urinating. There is casual discussion in the press galleries of the fact that Senator Cain of Washington, a Republican who made one of the longest speeches in the Dixiecrat filibuster, wore a clinical contraption to take care of his physical necessities. Part of this picture of high statesmanship is the recollection of Huey Long and his hot-water bottle, an unpublicized feature of his fifteen-hour filibuster of 1935. Nor does any of this, of course, get into the newspapers.

Senator Cain was ostensibly talking against the appointment of the President's friend, former Senator Mon C. Wallgren, Cain's predecessor from Washington, as head of the National Security Resources Board. But blocking Wallgren's nomination was only part of his objective. As the real-estate lobby's most active man in Congress Cain hoped that by aiding the Southern fili-

buster he was making it more likely that rent control would die on March 31, before the Administration's control-extension bill could be passed. Killing rent control is one of the specific objectives of the Republicans.

Cain, incidentally, is a man to watch. He is only thirty-nine—tall, thin, and wiry. His dark-hued face works wildly as he talks; he indulges in extravagant accusations and in spells of extreme self-righteousness. As he has shown in recent weeks, he will stop at no political trickery. Every generation of Senators apparently must have its Bilbo or its Huey Long, and in this Senate Cain fills the role.

THE actual parliamentary questions involved in the debate have been fantastically synthetic. Few newspaper and wire-service reports on the various steps of the interminable ritualistic wrangle have revealed what intolerable falseness and nonsense it all amounts to. The scenes enacted and the lines spoken in the murky Senate chamber this week have inadvertently made it clear that the Senate is hopelessly entangled in rules and precedents set up in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by a political aristocracy determined, above all else, to preserve its prerogatives. Under its present interpretation of the rules of "free and unlimited debate" the Senate has become as dangerously obsolete for these times as the House of Lords was in nineteenth-century England. And reform of the Senate is just as badly needed. Although the present fight began over the preliminary steps required for passing civil-rights legislation, more things than civil rights are now involved. The usefulness and survival of the Senate itself—and to some extent of the democratic process in general—are now in question.

The Senate tried to initiate a major reform in its rules in 1917, after a "small group of wilful men" had filibustered to death a vital bill on merchant shipping in the closing days of a lame-duck Congress. In the following session it immediately passed Rule 22, which permitted debate to be shut off by a two-thirds' vote. But the phrase "debate on a pending measure" was left in through oversight and formed a loophole for Senatorial obscurantists in later Congresses who insisted that it was not possible to break a filibuster on motions to take up measures or on amending the Senate journal—in other words, that Rule 22 was not intended to curb the filibuster.

Senator Vandenberg, as presiding officer in 1948, ruled for the obfuscators. He held that a Southern filibuster could not be stopped by cloture, since it happened at that moment to be waged against a motion to take up an anti-poll-tax bill rather than against the bill itself.

The present filibuster has wandered even farther into the realm of parliamentary travesty. It has been conducted against a motion to take up a measure to create a rule which will make filibusters against motions to

take up measures subject to cloture by two-thirds' vote. In an effort to get a vote on the motion Vice-President Barkley ruled that the 1917 definition applied to motions-to-take-up. He stated that in his opinion Vandenberg had faced a different set of circumstances in 1948. On the day after Barkley's ruling, Vandenberg—in

whom many things rankled, among them the loss of the Republican nomination last summer and what he considers cavalier treatment by the Foreign Relations Committee which he once headed—rose to challenge Barkley's interpretation, delivering one of the most sanctimonious and destructive speeches ever made in the Senate.

Molotov Goes—Where?

BY ALEXANDER WERTH

Prague, March 5

THE Kremlin is keeping the world guessing, and some amusement must be derived these days in Moscow from the immense number of theories that are being put forward everywhere on the reasons for Molotov's and Mikoyan's "dismissal." What information is available here, together with what we know of Soviet practice in the past, suggests that the mystery is fairly easy to solve. Molotov's removal from the Soviet Foreign Office is not half so sensational as was his elevation to the post in 1939, when he succeeded Litvinov. In one respect, though, the two cases are similar. Litvinov was replaced by Molotov because of a sharp change in the international situation which made Litvinov's policy of collective security no longer useful. Today, in the Russian view, the policy of "overtures" to the United States and the policy embodied in Vishinsky's harangues to the United Nations in favor of atomic control, disarmament, and so on have also ceased to serve any purpose.

The Russians regard the Atlantic Pact, which they have been doing their utmost to prevent, as proof that the West does not want to come to an agreement with them—on terms acceptable to them. Molotov's removal from the Foreign Ministry is therefore, in a way, a demonstration to the world that "the West has missed its chance" of responding to the various Russian peace offers, disarmament offers, and compromise proposals on Berlin, and that in Vishinsky it will meet a more ruthless opponent than in Molotov, who, it is claimed, was more willing to argue on a high diplomatic level than Vishinsky will be. (That diplomatic etiquette has sadly declined in Moscow may be seen from the stories published in *Pravda* last week openly accusing a recent United States ambassador of being a black-marketeer.)

There the analogy ceases between Litvinov's case and Molotov's. Litvinov's career virtually ended in 1939; Molotov will, to all appearances, be promoted. He is one

of the oldest members of the Politburo and, especially since Zhdanov's death, Stalin's most obvious successor. No longer burdened with departmental duties, he will become the directing hand of Russian foreign policy in all its ramifications. For the Foreign Ministry is not everything. There is also the Cominform, and there is Soviet propaganda abroad. There are specific problems like Communist China, with which the U. S. S. R. has no formal diplomatic relations, and others, like Markos's Greece, Yugoslavia, and Indonesia, which are not directly connected with the work of the Foreign Ministry. Molotov will in all probability coordinate Russian policy and action in all these areas. Similarly, Mikoyan is likely to be the super-chief of all economic relations with the outside world, and to play a prominent part in the Eastern Economic Council. The practice of relieving a minister who is also a high party official of his departmental duties and giving him much wider, though less clearly specified, powers is not a new one in Russia. In 1946 Beria, the Minister of the Interior (NKVD), was made a deputy premier without portfolio but with all departments concerned with security under his supervision.

Molotov will also be able to devote much more of his time to the Communist Party. Stalin is nearly seventy, and the leadership of the party is becoming a major problem in Russia. On both domestic and foreign matters all important decisions are in fact taken by the Central Committee and its Politburo. Stalin may need in this sphere an older and more experienced deputy than Malenkov, who recently succeeded the late Zhdanov as first secretary of the Central Committee. Molotov's advice may also help the Central Committee to avoid pitfalls in the foreign field, since for all his roughness Molotov is a cold and careful calculator. Zhdanov was a fire-eater with little or no experience of the outside world, and in this Malenkov and Suslov are believed to be like him. It is probable that both Molotov and Mikoyan will be appointed vice-premiers without portfolio; it is possible that Molotov will become premier in place of Stalin, who would remain secretary general of the Communist Party.

While this seems the most probable explanation of

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what is happening in Russia, more spectacular explanations cannot be entirely dismissed. It is widely believed that Molotov and Mikoyan have not been in complete agreement with the more extravagant party lines on propaganda, art, and science, or with the peculiar primitivism and self-congratulatory tone of the propaganda. Although Molotov delivered Zhdanov's funeral oration last September, he is known to have disagreed with some of his views. Yet it would be rash to conclude that Molotov's removal from the Foreign Ministry points to profound differences in outlook among the Soviet leadership, and to the victory of the younger and tougher die-hards over the older and more cautious men. Only if it is learned that Molotov and Mikoyan are in disgrace can such a conclusion be drawn; nothing warrants it at present.

There is little indication that the Russians will now become more "reasonable." They may feel they have

exhausted the possibilities of "pleading with the West" through the medium of Mr. Vishinsky's U. N. speeches and of Stalin's telegrams to foreign newspapermen, but their policy will remain fundamentally the same. There will be fewer speeches, and at the U. N., which has been a disappointment to the Russians, they will be less prominent than in the past, and will be represented chiefly by second-grade persons like Gromyko and Malik, and perhaps even smaller fry. As one Soviet source here in Prague commented, "It was bad enough for a Deputy Foreign Minister like Vishinsky to batter his head against a stone wall in public; for a Foreign Minister it wouldn't do at all." This suggests that there are going to be no more Vishinsky fireworks at the U. N. The changes in Moscow really mean a diminution of Soviet interest in the U. N. and a greater determination to strengthen and coordinate the Communist forces in the world, especially within the Soviet spheres of influence.

THE ATLANTIC PACT

An Inevitable Commitment

BY WALTER MILLIS

THE origins of the Atlantic Pact are almost as clear and simple as were those of the Monroe Doctrine, with which it is in many ways closely comparable. Its development and implications are perhaps proving rather more complex. The basic purpose of the proposed alliance can, I think, be succinctly stated; it is to assure all parties to the world problem, in advance and in as solemn and certain a way as is possible in human affairs, that an armed Soviet aggression on Western Europe will be regarded by the United States as an act of war and will find the United States from the outset fully engaged in any collective effort to repel it.

The purpose is not always clearly understood or stated in quite such bald terms; yet it is difficult to see what the projected pact means if it does not mean this. And it is equally difficult to see how the United States could, practically, avoid the commitment. A great deal of legal, political, and social theory has been expended upon weighing the "advantages" against the "disadvantages" of the pact; this seems to me to ignore the fact that the policy which it represents has been forced upon us, regardless of advantage or disadvantage. It is another example of the inveterate American fallacy of imagining

that this country is a completely free agent in a world which contains other wills than its own.

The Truman Doctrine of March, 1947, and the Marshall Plan, proposed in June of the same year, had announced the policy of placing our political influence and economic strength behind the defense and rehabilitation of Western Europe. The vigor of the Soviet reaction had already inspired doubts as to whether this would be enough; the events of February and March, 1948, seemed to make it clear that political and economic support would be futile unless they could be given a reasonably effective military base. No doubt some of the visions entertained at that time of an immediate advance by the Red Army were febrile and exaggerated. The fact remained that Czechoslovakia had been suddenly and violently subverted to communism, largely because of the presence of the Red Army on its borders, and that the opening moves in the blockade of Berlin were leveling a peculiarly deadly blow at the whole Western position in Germany, a blow that the West was helpless to parry because of its want of military strength. The day was to be saved, narrowly, by the mobilization of the air lift, but that was essentially a military instrument. The political and economic means to hold Western Europe against Communist ideological penetration had been furnished, but the combination of Communist infiltration backed by the immediate and overwhelming power of the Red Army could scarcely be resisted in the long run unless

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a countervailing military power were in the background.

How was it to be provided? Obviously, Western Europe could only be defended in the first instance by the resolution of the Western Europeans. Without that nothing would avail. But it was equally obvious that they were too weak to maintain a defense—or even, perhaps, to maintain the resolve to attempt one—by their unaided efforts. They were unlikely again to offer themselves as a sacrificial cushion, taking up the shock and loss of another invasion from the east until such a time as the United States might, or might not, intervene to extricate them from their ruins. No real defense, strong enough to affect current developments, to give Western Europe that minimum sense of security essential to stable economic recovery, and to be of some use in averting a future aggression, could possibly be constructed without active American aid today and firm assurance that should the aggression ever come, the United States would be involved from the first moment. Clearly, such a course must have many disagreeable consequences. But what was the alternative? There was none, save to withdraw the American frontier from the Elbe—where it now actually stands and must stand so long as we maintain occupation troops in Germany—to the Western Atlantic; immediately to compromise the Marshall Plan and ultimately to insure its destruction and the destruction of the whole policy which it represents and to which we are committed.

Disagreeable or not, this much was plain—so plain that even the Senate, traditional guardian of our isolationist liberties, understood it and adopted the Vandenberg Resolution on June 11, 1948, by sixty-four to four. It was scarcely a matter of choice. The resolution lacks the terseness and clarity of President Monroe's declaration, made under similar circumstances, but the sense is unmistakable. It advised the President to enter into a collective-security pact with the Western European powers of such a character as to assure the world that an armed Soviet attack upon any of those powers would be regarded as an act of war by the United States. Preliminary negotiations were immediately begun. I confess that I do not see what else could have been done under all the circumstances.

So far the case was simple; only at this point did difficulties begin to appear. Some of them seem less than serious. By its very origin and nature the pact must unavoidably be directed "against" Soviet Russia; it must bypass the helpless—indeed, the still unbuilt—machinery of the United Nations security system and it must recognize the limits placed by practical politics upon the theoretic and mystic freedom of Congress to declare, or refuse to declare, war. Although the pact is in itself a recognition of the absolute necessity for doing all these things, it had first to be defended against the accusation that it does them.

This has not proved particularly difficult. The first point was easily met by the State Department's bland comment upon the Vandenberg Resolution: "It is clear that these provisions are not directed against any country or group of countries; they are directed only against aggression"—which is true enough, even if it is also nonsense. Resort to Articles 51 and 52 has sufficed to save the U. N.'s face; and although the existence of the pact is a sufficiently blunt demonstration of the U. N.'s total failure as a security system, the use of the theories of "self-defense" and "regional agreements," itself an inheritance from the Monroe Doctrine, has been enough to preserve the U. N.'s moral authority until such a time as the organization may find a more effective role in world affairs.

The constitutional point has proved confusing, and Senator Connally, an ardent if at times unskilful supporter of the pact, got badly tangled up in it. But the recent Senate debate seems actually to have "cleared the air." Congress will retain unimpaired its power to declare war; but since there will be no enlargement of its power not to declare war—always dubious, and certainly inoperative through the long and successful history of the Monroe Doctrine—the matter has sunk to small importance. What is important, as John Foster Dulles has well insisted, is that widespread debate and the solemn rite of treaty ratification should make clear the understanding and conviction of the American public that an attack on Western Europe would be, just as much as an attack on Pearl Harbor, an attack upon themselves. There is little doubt that the American people do hold this conviction now. If the treaty formalizes it, writes it into our permanent policy, and convinces the world of its reality, the legalities will be of little consequence.

THE more serious difficulties are of quite a different order from these. The pact is a declaration that we will give military support to the Western Europeans now and, in the event of an attack, will regard their cause as our own. But who are the Western Europeans? How much support are we now to give? What is the military plan in case the attack should come? The pact itself is apparently to include no specifically military clauses—providing for the allotment of troops, supply of munitions, and so on—and probably should not do so, for it is not setting up an alliance to wage an existing war but a high political partnership designed to avert the outbreak of a future one. Nevertheless, it is basically a military instrument, and it can scarcely be perfected without a firm grasp of the military fundamentals.

This became embarrassingly apparent in the problem presented by the Scandinavians. The pact was being developed as an extension of the Brussels Pact to include the Canadians and the United States. This idea of a gradual growth was both logical and convenient; but

what about the nations in the meanwhile left exposed? The Norwegians wanted immediate protection, however slim it might be, and full membership in the Western community; the Swedes were disinclined to move so fast, and from a purely military point of view there was a good deal in their arguments. It seems apparent that the full story has not yet been told; but the impression is that the United States, lacking clear concepts of military actualities and potentialities, lacking sound strategic plans for the actual and potential defense of Europe, fumbled the affair rather badly. The Norwegians and the Danes are now boldly taking their fate in their own hands and applying for a membership which can hardly be refused. One applauds their courage and their hard-headedness. Whether the net result will be a militarily stronger or weaker Western alliance is perhaps another question.

It would take a very long essay adequately to relate the military to the political problem in all the varying cases of Scandinavia, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Arabia. Each presents special issues; in regard to each we now face the dilemma that to include the country in the Atlantic alliance mightily increases our present commitments and constrains our future strategy, whereas not to include it is now inferentially to consign it to the Rus-

sians, weakening its own powers of resistance and destroying its potentialities as an ally in time of need. One suspects that the matter might have been handled more adroitly than this, and would have been, had the State Department had a surer understanding of basic strategic plan and possibilities before it set out to negotiate what is at bottom a strategic instrument.

This is not entirely the State Department's fault. It seems clear to me that American strategic thought has lagged tragically far behind our political thought. The politicians have seen plainly that Western Europe is the key to the future of ourselves and our society. The strategists seem never to have assimilated this fact or, if they have, to have developed an adequate answer for it. They are still fascinated by visions of intercontinental wars in which, *after* Europe is consigned to the flames, they will seek to extinguish them by dropping atom bombs on Russia from distant bases in Alaska, Britain, Spain, or Arabia. Such a strategy not only stands at direct variance with a policy of Atlantic alliance, but it also seems to do little toward preventing an outbreak of the flames in the first place, which is surely a major purpose of military planning. Until the strategic foundations of our policy are sounder and surer, its political instruments are bound to be uncertain and fumbling in their effect.

The Fallacy of Containment

BY BLAIR BOLLES

THREE years ago George Kennan, then counselor of the American embassy in Moscow, told the State Department that in his belief the United States, by applying economic and military pressure from outside the Soviet orbit, could "promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." Mr. Kennan's dispatch was the first expression of the theory of containment which since March, 1947, has been the foundation of American foreign policy. The theory fathered the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, American rearmament last year, and the decision to create, with British and French cooperation, the western German state. Aside from the defection of Tito in Yugoslavia, no signs exist that the theory is leading us toward the promised goal. On the contrary, the Soviet Union is stronger as a world power than it was in 1947. Its capacity for inciting fear in other peoples has grown. The effect of the theory in operation has been to contain

the United States, by holding it in the arroyo of a rigid foreign policy, rather than the Soviet Union.

The Administration, however, remains confident that containment will achieve its purpose. For that reason it is advocating that the United States ally itself with Canada and selected Western and Southern European powers in a "North Atlantic" Pact. The necessary preliminary step to any debate about the pact itself is an examination of the theory of containment at work. The events of the past two years leave the impression that the theory rests on a delusion. The Soviets have not responded to it according to the forecasts. Instead of crying "Uncle!" they have busied themselves with a search for new sources of power. The one major change they have made in their government during the application of containment has been to remove Vyacheslav Molotov as Foreign Minister and replace him with Andrei Vishinsky, a doctrinaire who has adapted for diplomacy the military slogan of Marshal Foch: "Toujours l'attaque."

The Administration put the theory to work by enunciating the Truman Doctrine two years ago. Russia responded by refusing to negotiate seriously during the Moscow conference, March-April, 1947, for German and

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Austrian peace treaties. The conference finally collapsed after a long stalemate. The preliminary consultation between the United States and the Committee for European Economic Cooperation—at Paris, July, 1947—precipitated the announcement of the Communist Information Bureau. The Administration's presentation of the Marshall Plan to Congress was quickly followed by the Communist putsch in Czechoslovakia, which deepened Soviet control over the resources and production of the most advanced industrial country in Eastern Europe, except Russia itself. When the Americans, British, and French negotiated in London last March for the establishment of a western German state and when President Truman, aroused by events in Czechoslovakia, asked Congress to pass a new draft law and a universal-military-training act and to increase the military appropriation, the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin. The Soviets have already responded to the Administration's sponsorship of a North Atlantic Pact by putting pressure on Finland and scolding Sweden, by encouraging the Communist parties in France and Italy to defy their governments by professing their basic allegiance to Moscow, and by threatening Iran.


After two years of containment the East-West deadlock continues, the cold war goes on. The opinion of Henry Wallace that the United States began the cold war and can end it by conciliating Russia is fantastic, but American policy has not fulfilled its promise to end the cold war. Containment can never end it. Containment can only screw up tension. The theory of containment has a fatal shortcoming because it rests on incomplete knowledge. The author of the theory seems to know something of Russia but almost nothing of the United States. Working under that handicap, he overestimated the mechanical resources of this country when he recommended that we "confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable

world." The theory calls for worldwide activity on an almost equal level of intensity. But the United States has been able to apply counterforce only in one area, in Europe and the adjacent Near Eastern countries of Turkey and Iran.

THE theory failed to take into account the opportunities that Russia would still have for augmenting its strength and influence when the Maginot Line of containment diplomacy had barred its approach to those parts of Europe where we remain supreme. It neglected the appeal that communism, empty as its doctrine seems to most Westerners when put into practice, exerts for people who live in fearful poverty. Relying on the show of power as the basis of diplomacy and concentrating on one part of Europe, the United States has been helpless to stop the spread of Soviet influence into eastern and southern Asia, or to halt Russia's intensified exploitation of its own sphere of influence in Europe, including eastern Germany. The Soviets have steadily increased their pressure on Iran, and have found comfort in the American embarrassment in China, in Communist progress in Indo-China, and in the West's butchering of the problem of Indonesia. Our wishes prevail over Russia's only in the Western Hemisphere, at a few points in Asia, and on a deep beachhead in Europe. The Atlantic Pact at best can do little more than fix our hold on the existing beachhead, but it is more likely to weaken the hold.

Containment fails to achieve its goal because at bottom it is a negative notion. It means diplomatic trench warfare. It is a mere holding operation that absorbs our total capacity. It is true that by manning our beachhead we have kept safe our strategic position in the world. That has saved us from a fighting war. Twice in the twentieth century we have found that when the authority of a European power which is following an expansionist policy reaches the Atlantic, we must enter the battle. But the theory of containment itself, because of its incorrect estimate of modern world rivalries, threatens now to weaken our hold on Western Europe at the very moment the Administration hopes to strengthen it.

The Marshall Plan is the principal means by which we have solidified the European beachhead. The plan has provoked the Soviet Union to follow policies the United States finds menacing, and it probably will not enable Western and Southern Europe to move along under its own steam economically by 1952. But through the plan the United States has weakened the Communist parties in France and Italy, not by suppressing them but by creat-



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ing some employment and raising the standard of living. The Atlantic Pact, however, endangers this satisfactory feature of the Marshall Plan. The pact is meaningless unless it is supported by an enormous program of Western rearmament. Rearmament will require European industry to shift at least some of its present emphasis on producer and consumer goods to military weapons. It will mean that men who now have hope of making a decent living in a world of civilians must spend years in the army. It will dilute the psychological effect of the Marshall Plan by intensifying the sense of unrest and insecurity. It will retard recovery and will provide the Communists with new propaganda. Whatever strengthens the Communist parties enables Russia to speculate on the possibility of increasing its influence in Western Europe, while no door is open to us in Eastern Europe except the air waves carrying the State Department's Voice of America.

The failures of containment show that the United States cannot frighten the Soviet Union into docility. The United States will begin to impress the Soviet Union when it formulates positive proposals in foreign policy, like President Truman's Point 4 for the development of backward areas. The narrow focus of the containment policy prevents the United States from bringing into play its deep moral resources in the contest with Russia. The principal error in the theory of containment is its miscalculation of the basic factors that will determine in the long run whether America or Russia will command the great-

er world influence and whether they can compete without risking war. The key factor is not the size of armies or the range of airplanes but the appeal of each country's culture to cultures foreign to both, to all peoples restless for change, notably to the Asiatics and the Africans.

As a result of the glorification of military strength through containment, we are gradually coming to stand for the very policies which the Asiatics and the Africans and the East Europeans have been trying to escape. Containment has forced us to safeguard our positions on the fringes of Europe by supporting, half-heartedly but undeniably, old colonial powers like the Dutch, whose subject peoples find Russia and the Communists encouraging them and professing to take their side; and by upholding the governing class of Greece, which fattens on the misery of most Greeks; and by restoring Nazis to positions of power in Germany. The American record of economic assistance abroad since the war suggests that the containment policy permits us partially to restore the economic frameworks of those countries which habitually have lived in comparative ease, like England, but prevents us from reforming the framework of countries which need something drastic and new, like Greece. The North Atlantic Pact will not enable us to escape that damaging limitation but will only make it more severe. As the Hoover Commission observes in its report on the national security organization, "true national security depends more upon economic stability and political strength than upon military power."

The Pact and the U. N.

BY CLARK M. EICHELBERGER

THE Atlantic Pact might strengthen the United Nations by increasing stability in one of the world's most troubled continents; or it might injure the United Nations by increasing insecurity in the rest of the world. Its results may be determined by three factors: (1) the way in which the pact is brought within the framework of the Charter and the United Nations machinery; (2) the willingness of this government to give simultaneous assurances reinforcing American support of the universal-security obligations of the Charter; and (3) the character of the debate which precedes the signing of the pact.

The pact has both a technical and a moral relationship to the United Nations. It will be easier to fit it into the framework of the Charter than into its spirit.

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The mutual-defense agreement embodied in the pact is based upon the general obligations of the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, and upon Article 51, which recognizes the right of individual or collective self-defense when a member of the United Nations is the victim of armed attack, "until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Such measures as the members may take in self-defense shall immediately be reported to the Security Council and shall in no way affect subsequent action by the Council.

Article 52, which was quoted by the Department of State in its memorandum of January 14 on the proposed agreement, recognizes the "existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action." No enforcement action, however, shall be taken under such regional arrangements without the authorization of the Security

Council unless it is directed against an "enemy state."

It is clear that the North Atlantic Pact is not designed to facilitate the settlement of disputes between signatories; no appropriate machinery for that is created. For this purpose the European signatories are in the process of creating a Council for Europe. The pact is plainly directed against an attack from outside the membership of the Atlantic Pact and is based, therefore, upon the self-defense features of Article 51.

Two steps are contemplated under the pact. The first would be consultation among the signatories concerning a threat to the security or territorial integrity of one or more of them. As soon as a call for such consultation is issued, the Security Council will be informed. Should the second step, measures of self-defense, be necessary, the Security Council will likewise be informed, and such measures will in no way interfere with any action by the Council. Technically, therefore, procedures under the agreement accord with United Nations requirements.

THE problem, however, is not so much whether the pact complies technically with the terms of Article 51, and possibly 52 and 53, as what will be its moral effect upon the United Nations. Will the very size and importance of the nations signing the agreement cause it to overshadow the United Nations?

Although their metropolitan areas have a total population of less than one-eighth of the world's population, the nine nations of the Atlantic Pact include three of the five permanent members of the Security Council and all of the major colonial powers, and have over 50 per cent of the world's industrial capacity. It is reported that originally some of the drafters wanted the pact to authorize the signatories to consult in case of a general threat to the peace. Some of them wanted the pact to obligate the signatories to defend one another's colonial areas as well as their metropolitan areas from attack. Fortunately, the pact will require consultation only in case of a threat to the security or territorial integrity primarily of their metropolitan areas.

Obviously the nations of Western Europe and North America might more comfortably discuss their problems in a club of like-minded members than in the turbulent and goldfish-bowl atmosphere of the Security Council. Not only must such a tendency be checked if the pact is not to be harmful to the United Nations, but steps must be taken to guard against the danger that the colonial powers among them will vote as a bloc on such problems as Palestine and Indonesia.

Even with limitations on consultation procedures, one addition to the pact may be necessary to meet the fears of other United Nations members that too large a portion of the earth is contained in a regional arrangement. A provision could easily be inserted which would provide for third-party judgment by obligating the signa-

tories to seek the approval of the Security Council without the veto or the General Assembly for their action, either before or after the fact. In other words, the decision as to who is the aggressor might not be made by the parties individually but by some organ of the U. N.

It is true that Article 51 does not require approval of the Security Council for measures of self-defense but only that these measures shall be immediately reported to that body and that they shall not in any way affect its authority to act. Nevertheless, as an assurance that this very large and peculiar regional arrangement would be subservient to the United Nations, the signatories should be obligated to seek the approval of the Security Council or the General Assembly for their actions of self-defense. It may very well be that in this age of lightning warfare the signatories of the Atlantic agreement would not have an opportunity to obtain the authorization of one of these bodies before acting in self-defense. Then they should seek approval after the fact. Such a provision in the North Atlantic agreement would do much to assure some fifty members of the United Nations not included in it that the signatories had made all their procedures subservient to the U. N.

The third need is assurance to the world that the North Atlantic Pact will not encourage and facilitate bloc voting to the detriment of the United Nations. The United States government should give this assurance now, and emphasize it by its daily practice.

Not only must the Atlantic Pact be within the framework of the Charter, but simultaneous assurances should be given by the American government that it has not limited its security commitments to the Atlantic community and the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, all the signatories, particularly the permanent Security Council members, should reaffirm their universal Charter obligations.

Several weeks ago nineteen nations, representing a third of the membership of the United Nations and considerably over half the world's population, met at New Delhi, India, to consider the Indonesian question and passed a resolution, calling for United Nations action. These nations are subscribing to conciliation procedures, as in the Kashmir problem, more rapidly than was expected. In no way must they be made to feel that the obligations of the Charter have been forgotten so far as their part of the world is concerned, and that collective security now applies only to the more privileged nations of the Atlantic region. There are other members of the United Nations that need similar assurance.

The American government should precede or accompany the signing of the pact with the announcement that it regards a threat to any member of the United Nations as a threat to its security, and that it reaffirms its determination to adhere to the universal obligations of the Charter. Such a declaration could be accompanied by a statement that the United States intends to negotiate a

multilateral treaty, based upon Article 51, with all members of the United Nations which wish to sign. A universal pact of this kind has been proposed in slightly different forms by Hamilton Fish Armstrong and the American Association for the United Nations.

Such a pact would provide that in case of a threat to a member of the United Nations, and in a situation in which the Security Council was not acting, the matter would be brought before the General Assembly. Then if requested to do so by a two-thirds' vote of that body, including three of the five great powers, the signatories would go to the aid of the nation threatened. It would further provide that each signatory should set aside forces for this purpose, in the spirit of Article 43, which deals with the setting aside of contingents for police purposes. Under the multilateral treaty such forces

would be used by the signatories when they acted with the authority of the Security Council or the General Assembly.

The effect of the Atlantic Pact upon the United Nations will partly be determined by the arguments used in presenting it in the Senate. There will be universal support of the major objective of the pact—to give assurance to the nations of Western Europe that if they are attacked, this country will not wait for a Lusitania or a Pearl Harbor. Such assurance, however, must not be given in a way to increase insecurity in the rest of the world, for that would weaken the security of the Western Hemisphere. On the other hand, if the pact is so defined and presented as to strengthen the security systems of the entire world, the security of Western Europe will be doubly enhanced.

An Alternative Proposal

BY JAMES P. WARBURG

THERE has been a tendency on the part of our government to discourage discussion of the Atlantic Pact proposal on the ground that one cannot intelligently discuss a treaty one has never seen, and at the same time a tendency to veil the negotiations for this treaty in war-time secrecy. The result is likely to be the eventual presentation to the American people of an accomplished fact.

I submit that this is a most unwise way to make foreign policy. It means that a policy is adopted before it is understood and fully debated, that high-pressure propaganda must be used to "sell" the policy on an emotional basis, which rarely provides a lasting foundation, and finally that the government becomes the victim of its own propaganda.

When it became apparent, toward the end of January, that the negotiations for the Atlantic Pact were already far advanced and likely to proceed rapidly to the point of actual commitment, it seemed to me appropriate to make an attempt to provoke discussion of some of the issues involved. While the exact terms of the proposal were at that time unknown, enough had been disclosed by the Department of State and by the President to warrant some serious doubts about the basic assumptions upon which it appeared to be founded. I ventured to raise these doubts in a letter to the Secretary of State, and subsequently in two memoranda sent to a number

of Senators and Representatives. In the first of these memoranda I gave five broad reasons for careful scrutiny of the proposal. These were:

1. *The Geographical Loophole.* The proposed treaty will include some but not all of the free nations of Western Europe. This implies that the United States and Canada will not protect non-signatories. Thus the treaty in effect invites aggression against non-signatories.

By inviting aggression against nations not included in the security pact, the proposed treaty endangers the neighboring signatories. If, for example, Norway participates (as it has since agreed to do) while Sweden and Denmark do not, and if either of the two non-signatories should become the victim of aggression, the defense of Norway would become well-nigh impossible. Similarly, if Iran is left exposed, Turkey is endangered; if Turkey is left unprotected, Greece is imperiled; if Greece is not included, Italy becomes vulnerable; and if Italy is not a signatory, the southern flank of France becomes exposed.

2. *The Constitutional Loophole.* Under the proposed treaty Congress will, of course, preserve the right to declare war, to pass upon various means of carrying out our treaty obligations, and to appropriate the necessary funds. This means that there would be no certainty whether, when or in what circumstances the United States would actually throw its full weight behind a victim of aggression. Such uncertainty invites miscalculation by a potential aggressor and lulls the nations to be protected into a false sense of security.

3. *The Defense Dilemma.* The proposed rearmament of the European signatories will not provide them with effective defense—because of their insufficient manpower, inadequate present industrial capacity, and

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political instability—unless rearmament includes either the remilitarization and rearmament of western Germany, which would alienate Western European support, and to which we are officially opposed, or the stationing in Europe, before war starts, of large American contingents, which would certainly provoke Russian counter-measures.

4. *Defense Against What?* The primary threat to the free nations of Europe at the present time is political—via Communist subversion or penetration—rather than military. If Russia gained control of Western Europe, the Russian war potential would be increased to a point where Russian leadership might consider that a military challenge to the United States offered a chance of ultimate success. Therefore the best defense for Western Europe at this time is the rapid rebuilding of its economic health and political stability. That is the basic assumption of the Marshall Plan. However, to the extent that Western Europe turns from recovery to rearmament, its defenses against political penetration will be weakened. To the extent that American resources are diverted to rearming Western Europe, American aid to recovery will be diminished.

5. *The Dunkirk Danger.* From the point of view of our own national security, the proposed treaty commits us, in the event of war, to a strategy which would mean the reenactment of Dunkirk on a gigantic scale unless we had taken measures prior to the outbreak of hostilities which would insure our being able to hold Western Europe. Are we prepared to take such measures? Could we complete them without provoking attack? Unless both these questions can be answered by our military men in the affirmative, we should be committing our armed forces to the certainty of initial defeat.

The argument up to this point adds up to the contention that the proposed treaty, in its present form, is an unsound and dangerous weapon to use in the cold war. This raises the broader question of whether the time has not come to reexamine the basic premises of a foreign policy which has led, quite logically, to the present proposal, to consider whether we are not placing too little emphasis upon our constructive efforts for peace and too much upon a purely negative policy of strategic containment. It also raises the question whether we have not reached the point in our present policy at which the cold war ceases to be a method of seeking a peace settlement and becomes, instead, merely the preparation for an atomic war which is tacitly assumed to be inevitable.

In ordinary circumstances I do not think it to be incumbent on one who criticizes a proposal to offer a substitute. But these are not ordinary circumstances. We are already so deeply committed to some sort of Atlantic security pact that a complete reversal of policy is out of the question. Moreover, I have no quarrel with the purpose of the current proposal. I think it is most desirable to deter the Soviet Union from military adventure and

to give Western Europe as much reassurance against attack as we possibly can. I merely contend that the current proposal will not achieve these ends.

GIVEN these circumstances, I felt under obligations to offer a plan for modification of the Atlantic security pact and for the initiation of negotiations for a broader security system. This proposal, which I presented to the Secretary of State on February 26, urged the following changes, more fully stated than this space permits:

1. Limit the pact to the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Suspend all other conversations or negotiations.
2. Abandon the attempt to force, promote, or assist rearmament, except for purposes of *internal* security, by the four Continental signatories.
3. Demand, instead, (a) that the Continental signatories, while maintaining armed police forces, cease wasting their resources on rearmament against possible Soviet attack and devote their entire energies to economic recovery and political stability; (b) that France and the Netherlands agree to accept United Nations mediation of their current colonial wars; (c) that Great Britain, Canada, and the United States coordinate their war establishments to enable the maximum of power to be brought to bear instantly upon an aggressor against any of the signatories.

These proposed changes have two purposes. The first is to make it clear that the United States, Great Britain, and Canada would consider an attack upon the Continental signatories an attack upon themselves, without, however, implying that the United States, Great Britain, and Canada would necessarily fight such an enemy on the European continent. The second is to relieve the Continental signatories of the burden of rebuilding and maintaining armaments, and to enable them to apply their full energies to the strengthening of their social and economic defenses against political penetration or subversion.

Coming now to the matter of Germany, I suggest that the United States:

1. Suspend temporarily the attempt to write an occupation statute or a constitution for a western German state.
2. Demand the lifting of the Soviet blockade of the western sectors of Berlin as a precondition for an overall discussion of the entire problem of Germany.
3. Fix a date within the next three months when the Council of Foreign Ministers is to meet in Berlin.
4. Make it clear that our Secretary of State is going to Berlin with the intention of bringing about a four-power agreement to permit Germany to function as an economic whole, the removal of the zonal barriers to trade and travel, the creation of conditions in which the *Länder* (state) governments may function under four-power supervision on a basis similar to that now established with regard to the Austrian government and in

which the *Länder* governments may gradually work toward the establishment of a federal government for all of Germany, the withdrawal of occupation forces other than the minimum contingents required to maintain internal order and to prevent illegal rearmament.

With regard to these proposals, it should be made perfectly clear that the Council of Foreign Ministers would *not* now be expected to write a German peace treaty. At present we seem not to wish to resume the attempt to unify Germany on the federal principle, although officially we favor unification. If we are now in favor of partition, we should say so. If not, we should deny to the Russians the propaganda advantage of apparently favoring unification while we oppose it.

Two major obstacles to agreement with the Russians are (a) control of the Ruhr—if Germany begins to function as an economic entity under four-power supervision, the Russians would automatically obtain a voice in the control of Ruhr industry; and (b) reparations. There is a way to reach a compromise on the ambiguous Yalta Agreement, namely, to agree that Germany shall pay certain reparations out of current production, but not until after it is self-supporting and has repaid the money pumped into the western zones.

If agreement were reached on the Ruhr and reparations, it might be possible to obtain Russian agreement to a revision of the Polish-German frontier with respect to some of the purely agricultural territories.

THIS proposal with regard to Germany goes hand in hand with the next item, namely, the Treaty of Europe. This would be a treaty among the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, to be proposed as an extension to all Europe of the disarmament idea contained in the modified Atlantic security pact. It would:

1. Guarantee the permanent demilitarization of Germany and the control of Ruhr coal and steel for the benefit of all of Europe, including Germany. The second guaranty should be contingent upon an agreement that the principle of allocating coal and steel should apply to all European producers of these products, not, however, including Great Britain or the Soviet Union. Russia, Great Britain, and the United States would have no voice, except perhaps as arbiters, in the allocation of coal and steel among the European countries. Continental countries, like France or Poland, would have a voice only if their own production were subject to allocation by the European Coal Authority.

2. Provide for the withdrawal from Europe west of the Soviet frontier of all United States, British, and Russian troops, except that Russia on the one hand and Great Britain and the United States on the other shall have the right to maintain not over two divisions in Germany and Austria. But this would not prevent the United States from stationing forces, in agreement with Great Britain, in the British Isles.

3. The treaty would guarantee all the nations of Europe west of the Soviet frontier against aggression, as defined by the United Nations Security Council, on condition that these nations themselves would agree to maintain only such military forces as are necessary to preserve internal order, and that they would agree further to permit inspection by United Nations authorities of all military establishments and factories capable of producing offensive weapons.

This treaty would get the Russian army back behind the Soviet frontier except for a token force in Germany and Austria, while still leaving a token American force which would have to be over-run if the Red Army moved westward. Likewise it would relieve all Europe of the burden of maintaining armaments and save the United States the cost not only of rearming Western Europe but also of an indefinitely protracted E. R. P.

The negotiation of a similar treaty with regard to Asia should be contemplated at some time in the not too distant future. In this treaty Australia might perhaps take the place of Great Britain as the third guarantor.

In presenting these alternative ideas I wrote to the Secretary of State as follows:

These suggestions are put forward—not as an ultimate solution—but as a means of providing the most effective temporary guaranties of peace and security in a world which still operates on the anachronistic principle of power politics. The ultimate solution requires the establishment of a world organization capable of enacting, administering, and enforcing world law. In the meanwhile, however, the foregoing procedure might offer . . . advantages over the course at present contemplated.

Doubtless the plan contains flaws and is subject to objections. I have put it forward in the hope that criticism and discussion will shape it into a more useful program than that at present sponsored by our government.

It may well be that the negotiations have gone so far that a modification of the pact itself is no longer possible. But even if that should be true, the rearmament program will remain open to discussion and reconsideration. Nor is there anything in the treaty to prevent our undertaking the other parallel actions suggested.



Dean Acheson

Del Vayo—The European Opposition

THE countries of Western Europe have given their blessing to the Atlantic Pact, and early in April, after this or that slight modification of the text, they will affix their signatures. But it would be a mistake to assume that the new alliance has the approval of everybody in Europe who does not subscribe to the ideology of the Kremlin. A survey of non-Communist opinion in the various countries discloses that the pact's value at this time is widely questioned.

Let us begin with France. The conservative *Paris Monde*, which has a greater influence on people's thinking about foreign policy than any other newspaper, has taken the lead in promoting an objective discussion of the pact. In one article it criticized the United States for preventing a Scandinavian regional agreement. In another article the French academician and historian, Etienne Gilson, developed the theory that Western Europe would be safer if it maintained its neutrality between the great American and Russian worlds—while trying constantly to lessen their antagonism—than if it intrusted its security to the illusory protection of the pact.

Such criticism of the pact makes security the dominating consideration. It emphasizes Europe's uncertainty about whether America will supply military aid in time and in sufficient volume to stop an advance of the Russian armies. The majority of French comment, usually analytical and precise, reveals distrust of Senator Vandenberg's vague statement that the Atlantic Pact would offer "infinite assurance" against a third world war merely by asserting the "community of interests" between the United States and the nations of Europe. Those nations are bound to ask, as various French commentators have noted, whose interests—America's or Europe's—will dominate the Atlantic Pact.

Even members of the Cabinet show the same concern. Premier Queuille, when interviewed by an American news agency, revealed how anxious he was to have the signing of the pact followed immediately by a flow of arms, material, and even troops to Europe. To Western Europeans the pact and military aid are inextricably bound together. No wonder, then, that certain European foreign offices became jittery when they discovered that in the view of American Congressional leaders the pact and military aid are two separate steps, and that the second does not necessarily follow from the first.

Other elements in French public life, farther to the left than *Le Monde* but also anti-Communist, are worried chiefly by the problem of a divided France. Their attitude has been forcefully expressed by the editor of *Combat*, Claude Bourdet, who points out that at least a fourth, perhaps a third, of the population does not think France should place itself unconditionally in the American camp. "When such a large group," he wrote recently, "believes that a certain policy, like joining the Atlantic Pact, will lead to catastrophe, it will inevitably try to thwart that policy by every means in its power. The courts will have little difficulty in building up a legal case of sedition, but the political prob-

lem will remain. And it will not be resolved by invoking a conception of treason [he referred to Thorez's announcement that French Communists would not fight against the Russians] at which the historians of tomorrow will smile."

Many non-Communist critics of the Atlantic Pact would have preferred armed neutrality for Western Europe. In the words of some of the former Resistance groups, this "would have prevented pro-Russian agitation among peoples interested in preserving peace in their own territory and have made the Russians hesitate before advancing into regions which did not contain American bases threatening the Soviet Union's security."

Above all, French critics believe that the West should have exhausted every possible means of reaching an agreement with the East before taking a step which may make the gulf between them unbridgeable. It was not a Communist or Socialist but an M. R. P. Catholic deputy, Paul Boulet, who on March 1 asked the French government to invite President Truman and Premier Stalin to meet in Paris. When Secretary of State Acheson outlined the objectives of the pact on March 9, he began by saying that the pact had been made necessary by Russian obstructionism in the meetings of Foreign Ministers and elsewhere; in other words, the United States was fed up with trying to reach an accord with the Russians. But in the opinion of many Europeans, diplomats who are trying to save the peace should neglect no opportunity for making another attempt.

This view is constantly reiterated in the independent press. Writers point out that in other fields contact and collaboration continue. The successful outcome of tariff conversations between Moscow and London, the conclusion of a commercial treaty between London and Warsaw, trade negotiations now in progress between France and Eastern Europe—all prove that intercourse is not impossible. In spite of the schism between the West and the East there was an increase of commercial exchange in 1948, and the general tone of the latest deliberations of the U. N.'s Economic Commission for Europe, which meets in Geneva and on which twenty nations of the Continent, including the U. S. S. R., are represented, justifies the hope that organized economic cooperation will finally be attained.

In Italy the pact is no less criticized in non-Communist circles than in France, though the Pope has thrown the whole weight of his influence in its favor. If the Vatican is not found among the signatory powers, it will not be because it has not worked hard to obtain the pact.

The directorate of the right-wing Italian Socialist Party has declared itself against Italy's entry into the pact. Opposition was carried so far that Saragat and the other two right-wing Socialist ministers almost had to resign from the government. With his usual cleverness Saragat managed to avert the crisis, but that does not diminish the importance of a resolution passed by his party which said that the inclusion of Italy in "any pact that might sooner or later en-

tail commitments" would be damaging not only to Italian but to European interests because of Italy's geographical position and internal difficulties.

In the other Italian Socialist party, which still retains the bulk of Socialist labor although it is no longer led by Pietro Nenni, opposition to the pact extends to people who cannot possibly be called pro-Communist. One of its best minds, Riccardo Lombardi, writing in *Avanti*, has protested against the policy of shackling Italy to the pact and making it "an American colony."

Other European countries are also divided. Many people who are rabidly anti-Russian fear that the Atlantic Pact may precipitate a war which the Americans, lacking the necessary bases in Europe, cannot win, or at least cannot win before Europe has been devastated. This fear was expressed by the conservative London *Observer* on February 20:

...If Russia had overrun and occupied the whole of Western Europe, she might be no longer afraid of America. With the Red Army posted along the shores of the Atlantic and of the Pacific alike, the Kremlin would dominate all Europe and practically all Asia; more than a billion people, and an area which could in all probability defeat an atomic-bombing offensive by its mere extent. . . . And America would face the hostile Eurasian double-continent without an ally and without a base for counter-attack.

In Scandinavia enthusiasm for the Atlantic Pact is not so great as the adherence of Norway and the probable adherence of Denmark may have led Americans to believe. The figures of the vote taken in the Norwegian Labor Party congress called to pass upon the matter—429 votes in favor out of a total of 499—did not reveal the intense concern expressed during the debate that preceded the decision. In

regard to Denmark, one should remember that as late as February 12, at an informal press conference in Copenhagen, the Danish Foreign Minister, Gustav Rasmussen, said very plainly that the United States was not serving the cause of world peace by insisting, as a condition of military aid, on the participation of Scandinavia in the Atlantic Pact.

In Sweden the pact is viewed with an alarm which has expressed itself in the press, as well as in the speeches of Prime Minister Erlander and the discussions in the Riksdag. During the latest debate on February 9 only a few speakers, chiefly members of the liberal People's Party, favored siding with the West. Finland may be dismissed as a neutral on account of its difficult position, but the arguments of Prime Minister Fagerholm against the inclusion of Scandinavia represented the opinion of many Europeans that even if the pact appears necessary, its threat of military action ought not to have been brought to the frontiers of Russia.

In Switzerland, apart from the official well-known attitude of eternal neutrality, public discussion of the pact has raised the same doubts and questions. Speaking at the University of Lausanne, M. Denis de Rougemont, a leader of the movement for a Federated Europe, said that the problem "is to escape the alternative of being 'policed' by the Russians or 'colonized' by the Americans," and doubted the practical value of the pact in preventing war.

Through all these reactions of non-Communist Europeans the same question appears again and again. If Germany is not going to be allowed to have a real army, and if the small and still poorly equipped armies of France and Benelux—not to mention Italy—are going to be undermined by their own political divisions, who is going to fight Russia should the Atlantic Pact lead to war?



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The Will, the Lament, the Fall.

We have no inviolate instants where we are
Solid happiness hewn from day, set apart
From others afar.

Human islands under their seas have roots
Spread through the multitude's fretful blood,
And to passionate childhoods.

To steel the will against awareness would banish
The angel who arrives each instant
From the horrific flesh;

Who warns that power, fear, agony, are the life under many;
That the real is the terrible; that to deny
This, unsheathes tyranny.

Listen, for his voice offers charity, hope, freedom . . .
Beggared charity, false hope, freedom to weep. True, and yet
He is truth's own doom
Blowing news of evil on a golden trumpet.

STEPHEN SPENDER

Foreign Policy for Liberals

LIVING WITH CRISIS. By Fritz Sternberg. The John Day Company. \$2.50.

NOTHING divides American liberals as much as foreign policy. On domestic issues the Wallace Progressives can distinguish themselves from A. D. A. Democrats and A. D. A. Republicans only by promising half again as much of the same in nothing flat. In foreign policy, however, the differences are profound. The Progressive Party is so full of outgoing love for Soviet mankind that it ends up by adhering to the Communist line of American isolationism. Other liberals, while fully conscious of the need to prevent Communist expansion by military preparedness and by promoting European recovery, are only dimly aware of the transitional and long-term economic, political, and social measures necessary to stop communism and establish progressive democracy. In other words, they lack a

precise program based upon a study of history and an accurate knowledge of the facts of our own time.

Such a program, spelled out in simple detail, American liberals can find on the concluding pages of Mr. Sternberg's "Living with Crisis." The rest of the book is an impressive justification of the program, step by step. Perhaps the best-informed economists could prove Sternberg wrong on minor details, though he is exact in citing his sources, and without doubt some economists as well as students of social and political matters will disagree with certain conclusions, especially those students who are deemed great because they speak in foggy sentences. There is nothing foggy in Mr. Sternberg's thinking; he proceeds from facts to findings with the utmost simplicity and positiveness. Perhaps he does not in this little volume take in enough facts to satisfy the most exacting, though he presumably will in the much larger and more comprehensive volume he is working on. But the program he pro-

poses has a prophetic quality which deserves the most serious consideration in view of his earlier and now realized foresight. This reviewer has been able to detect only one inaccuracy, on page 157, where he says of England that in non-Russian Europe it is "the only state that, since the end of the war, has had a stable government with a majority in parliament." That mistake is, as the Little Flower would say, a "beaut," the rushing kind that can be forgiven.

Mr. Sternberg builds up the case for his programmatic summary of what American foreign policy—and the complementary domestic policies—should be in four chapters: I, The United States after the Second World War; II, Europe in Crisis; III, The Soviet Union and the Russian Empire; and IV, What Ahead? The first three describe the economic, social, and political transformations that have occurred since the beginning of World War I in each of the three areas. The decline and shrinkage of Europe, the rise of Russia and the much greater increase of American power, with consequent rivalry of Russia and America for the alliance of Europe, are dramatically set forth. The importance of a Western European Union if Russian expansion is to be stopped becomes vividly plain. And Sternberg holds that a union, to succeed in this objective, must necessarily be based on a socialized Britain and a socialized Ruhr (western Germany). Thus American policy comes into focus.

America must give "a clear-cut yes to rearmament in the United States and Europe," at the same time realizing that this can stop Russian expansion only for a time and that a truce economy at home without adequate economic and social controls may at any time precipitate the crash for which Russia is waiting. America must support the Marshall Plan and military lend-lease, "but under conditions that will make Europe strong and independent, that will enable it to determine its own future, to change its social structure in line with European trends, even though these trends may not accord with certain American conceptions." "Only a progressive Europe,

March 19, 1949

solving its crisis while transforming its social structure, offers a guaranty of peace."

The Russians have but two weapons: one is military strength; the other is the crisis. Both can be broken by an American foreign and domestic policy tailored to this purpose. The great handicaps of the Soviet Union are the low standard of living and the absence of political and personal freedom. If the West will hold to and develop its own standards of living and of freedom, and if the pressure of these standards is exerted to the very borders of the Russian empire, that empire will disintegrate by secession, and even the Soviet Union will have to adjust itself to democratic currents.

BRYN J. HOVDE

Report on Japan

PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN JAPAN. By T. A. Bisson. The Macmillan Company. \$2.75.

THIS is another of the series of Institute of Pacific Relations studies on Japan under American occupation. Its author, after long experience in China, served in Japan from 1945 to 1947, first on the Strategic Bombing Survey and then in the Government Section of General MacArthur's Headquarters.

Mr. Bisson's findings, based on long and close observation and participation, are much like the findings of the majority who have reported on post-war Japan. He believes the prospects for democracy to be dim and growing dimmer. He writes no polemic. He tries to be objective. He relies on facts rather than argument. He traces the unfolding of events in both politics and economics, from the surrender to the present, and to this reviewer he seems to make a good case. Certainly he is borne out by the events since he wrote. The election of the Yoshida majority to the Diet definitely put back in the saddle in Japan the kind of men who were there before the war, with some verbal protective coloration. Any public man in Japan today would be as likely to declare himself against democracy as an American would to declare himself for infantile paralysis; but if the public man in Japan has not his tongue in his cheek when he comes out for democracy, at least there are a world and centuries of

difference between what he means by democracy and what we mean.

After the surrender, Mr. Bisson believes, there was a genuine upsurge of sentiment for democratic principles and institutions among the Japanese people. It was our duty as well as our national interest, he holds, to encourage and nurture that sentiment, to give it free play. For if we were really to defeat Japan and be safe from it, there was a necessity to eliminate the forces that had made it as it was, which meant to change the balance of forces in Japanese society. This was not easy. We might not have succeeded at the best. A military occupation has almost insuperable handicaps, and, moreover, few Americans really knew Japan and still fewer knew the language.

We did not do as much as we might have, even considering the handicaps. It was not enough to demilitarize the country. It was necessary to destroy or weaken the breeding grounds of the old militarism—the entrenched and reactionary bureaucracy, the feudal financial-industrial plutocracy, and such instruments for controlling the government, the economy, and the mass of the people as the neighborhood associations, the fisheries associations, and the agricultural associations.

We made a brave beginning—purges of military and bureaucracy, steps toward dissolution of the feudal economic combines, assurance of freedom of expression, encouragement of labor organization. But the entrenched groups were resourceful and persevering, and we were not. The old political groups slowly regained control of the parties and the Diet. The so-called Zaibatsu were supple and in essence kept their monopoly. The bureaucracy was in the main left intact. Inflation was unchecked, which inured to the profit of those who always had had the profits and incidentally put the obligation of supporting the Japanese people on the American occupation. Indeed, even the occupation authorities began to suspect that those who controlled the Japanese economy were sabotaging it in order to make the Americans pay, then get tired of paying, and then either leave or turn over the direction of Japanese affairs to those who always had exercised it. And that, in fact, is not far from what is happening now. Incidentally, there is a

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fair prospect that American industrial and financial interests will be cut in on the profits from direction of Japanese affairs, and this makes one even more uneasy.

There may be a valid refutation of Mr. Bisson's case, but thus far it has not been made. Meanwhile Mr. Bisson's short study is a valuable contribution to thinking on the Far East.

NATHANIEL PEPPER

Morals Without Theology IN SEARCH OF A WAY OF LIFE.

By Edgar E. Singer, Jr. Columbia University Press. \$1.75.

CONCEPTIONS of man's place in the scheme of things which accept a frankly naturalistic account of the world have been under vigorous attack in recent years. Naturalism as a philosophic outlook is repeatedly dismissed, with varying degrees of vehemence and condescension, as insensitive to genuine spiritual values and to the grandeurs and tragedies of human existence. And it is almost fashionable in some quarters to blame nearly all the current ills of mankind on the habit of thought which takes its standards of evidence and truth from modern science.

It is difficult to counter such charges, in large measure because it is not easy to reason with those who hold reason and logic in contempt. In point of fact, however, some of the most eloquent expressions of moral idealism, making central the values of devotion to communal good, contemplative knowledge and art, have come from thinkers who reject supernatural foundations for human goodness. To this great company of philosophic minds Professor Singer has long belonged; and in the lectures delivered on the Matchette Foundation at Columbia University, and now printed in the present small volume, he reaffirms in stately and moving cadences a conception of the good life that is based without equivocation on the discipline of scientific reason.

An adequate scheme of life, according to Mr. Singer, is a dedicated life, one which involves the subordination of human desires to a supreme objective that is valid for all men at all times. He argues, and argues persuasively, that such an objective cannot be one which is ever actually attainable; but he also

maintains with no less persuasion that the requisite ideal must be one to which progressive approximation can be made. Such an ideal, he finally shows, consists in men so conducting themselves that the future will find them stronger than if some other mode of conduct had been adopted. It would be a gross error to suppose, however, that Mr. Singer is recommending the worship of brute force and power. On the contrary, a straightforward consequence of his supreme objective is that men are required to transcend a narrow conception of self-interest and to undergo sacrifices for the sake of a world of cooperative perfection and of a community of collective omniscience. Moreover, the strength which is postulated as the goal of human endeavor demands a pious regard for the human past and a cultivated sensitivity to human art: regard for history, so that one may understand more fully the conditions and sources of strength required for achieving a progressive civilization; and sensitivity to art, in order to develop in men that heroic mood which can sustain them in contemplating and controlling their destiny. Mr. Singer places no credence in personal immortality. Nevertheless, he believes that men can and should rationally aim at so living that something survives their own death—the contribution they make toward the realization of life's supreme ideal.

Mr. Singer's statement of his problem and the structure of his argument are strongly reminiscent of Kant; but the resemblance is more formal than substantial, and his outline of the elements of a good life rests firmly on the factual basis supplied by experimental science. The pattern for human excellence he presents so gracefully is emphatically not a pattern for an escapist withdrawal from the human scene. But at the same time Mr. Singer assigns an integral place in his moral scheme to the intellectually and emotionally sustaining values that characterize the most enlightened expressions of a religious or dedicated conception of life. He has provided another proof that a moral ideal adequate to the full range of human aspirations can be formulated and justified, without benefit of theology, mystery mongering, or the abdication of critical judgment.

ERNEST NAGEL


Fiction in Review

WITH her second novel, "The Christmas Tree" (Scribner's, \$2.75), Isabel Bolton establishes herself as the best woman writer of fiction in this country today. One stays with the novelists of her own sex because Miss Bolton's work is essentially feminine in manner, in the delicacy and modesty of the face it turns to the world, though it quite avoids the self-imposed limitations of most contemporary female writing. I have often spoken in this column of a point of view which unhappily unites the work of all of our most talented and conscientious women authors, the fact that external reality seems to exist for them only as a means of reflecting their own highly developed powers of awareness. Miss Bolton operates under no such over-arching self-reference. While her sensibility is as keen as that of Katherine Anne Porter or Eudora Welty, Carson McCullers or Jean Stafford—to name the women writers who have come to most renown—unlike them she has what we must call a masculine readiness to place her gifts of feeling and observation at the service of an objective universe. She is willing to make the reader a free gift of life as she sees it instead of merely playing life out from herself on a long leash.

In her first novel, "Do I Wake or Sleep," Miss Bolton undertook to contrast the moral climates of modern European and American culture. It was a short, concentrated, technically brilliant performance. To my taste its tone was too precious; but I could easily forgive this fault because the content of the book was so bold and exciting. With her new novel, Miss Bolton more than holds the position she won with its predecessor; she advances it. Less scintillating than "Do I Wake or Sleep," "The Christmas Tree" has the compensation of also being less "written." Its emotions are more open, richer, warmer, wider. A rarity and wonder these days, it is a novel whose sympathies and insights enlarge rather than simply confirm our own. Dealing with that most hazardous of themes, the sources of homosexuality, it adds a whole new dimension of feeling to anything fiction has hitherto given us on the subject.

"The Christmas Tree" is as little clinical a novel as it is fashionable or sensational in any other way. Miss Bolton has asked herself the question so many people are asking these days: what is there in our society that accounts for the alarming increase in male homosexuality? And her answer—whether it is the correct answer or not is irrelevant; there is no reason, of course, to suppose there is a single correct answer—is that the disruption of our sexual patterns is but another inevitable manifestation of the disruption throughout our culture. Her line of reasoning runs something like this: the rigors of Victorian society were a last-ditch protection against the encroachments of science and a rising industrialism upon a world previously ordered by faith in God. Victorian morality was a firm façade for a crumbling house whose inhabitants were left with no place to lodge their emotions. When the women, so paralyzingly trained to be ladies, suddenly found themselves without the security of the drawing-room life for which they had been prepared, they were incapable of making a rough public way for themselves. Their charms, their human drives, their intellects had but a single respectable outlet—their sons. So they seduced their sons with all the strength for life and love that was dammed up in themselves and then turned the sons, their nerves aqiver, out into a world which by now had lost even its façade of order, to make their own fates and find their own loves.

Such a redaction of Miss Bolton's novel may make it sound didactic. It is anything but that. Miss Bolton works like a mosaic-maker, piecing together bits of scenes and persons—it is a full panorama, really, and a full cast, though we get both in such tiny fragments—until finally the whole pattern and intention are laid out before us, and in unbelievably small compass. By what miracle of selection and organization, indeed, she catches in 212 short pages all we need to know of four generations of her Danforths, a story which in the hands of any other writer would have been a giant tome of a novel, is a not-to-be-fathomed secret of her craft. She could not have done it, one is sure, had she used a different narrative style. The reader may be too conscious of, even irritated by, her long Proustian



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sentences; they admirably connect past and present, however, and permit Miss Bolton, with the greatest economy, at once to recollect, create, and comment upon. And only occasionally does she indulge the temptation to be "fine"; for the most part her language is simple and forthright, her lengthy sentences firm.

When she wrote "Do I Wake or Sleep," Miss Bolton was, we learn, past sixty. Her talent is not a youthful one, though it has the energy and promise of growth. On the contrary, it redefines and celebrates maturity, teaching us what it means to grow older in wisdom—something we are likely to forget in a culture like ours, in which the beginnings are always so dramatic and, so often, all; for Miss Bolton has not only the social perspective of her years but also a beautifully ripened emotional understanding of the relation between pain and perversity, love and destruction, art and death. Reading "The Christmas Tree," I kept thinking of Truman Capote's "Other Voices, Other Rooms," with its effort to place the blame for its young hero's homosexuality and thereby excuse him of responsibility. Miss Bolton has no impulse to blame; she blames no one, neither Larry Danforth himself nor his mother nor his mother's mother, for Larry's homosexuality; she and we suffer for him and with him, just as we suffer with his mother, his lover, his wife, his child. But she has the impulse to responsibility of a wholly mature human being. In Miss Bolton's universe as in the theology of St. Paul we are all part of one another, and if the world goes down, we must all go down with it, together; but together, not in torments of accusation, but, rather, in affection and knowledge. DIANA TRILLING

Drama

JOSEPH
WOOD
KRUTCH

CLIFFORD ODETS was a brash and talented young man when—to adopt his own point of view—he "sold himself to the movies." He emerges now still brash and still talented but hardly improved. He is as indignant as he must always have assumed that he would be, and "The Big Knife" (National Theater) is an exposure of the movie capital which must take its place beside the exposures of the advertising business written by bright young advertising men and the exposures of the publishing business written by bright young publishers. Since understatement was never his besetting sin, this is, not unexpectedly, a very Hollywoodish version of Hollywood. All the emotions are represented in gorgeous technicolor.

Most of us think of Hollywood as a place where mediocrity is overpaid—in money and in fame; but to Mr. Odets it is, instead, a place where genius is prevented from expressing itself. His hero is a fabulously successful young leading man of the films whose better self we are expected to take on faith while he, languishing under a fourteen-year contract assuring him several million dollars, laments that he cannot get away from it all into some world where he can indulge his natural integrity. The fact that this hero is played—and played very well—by John Garfield, who is in real life himself a fabulously successful young leading man of the films, seems to put him also in the ambiguous position of the author and to make the whole production appear a rather re-

markably vivid example of what might be called biting the hand that overfeeds you. What, one is always tempted to ask, prevents this hero from getting away from it all? And the action of the play is really one long effort to convince us that he can't.

It seems that before the first curtain rises he had been on a drunken spree with an extra-girl and had had the misfortune to run down a child in the street. It seems further that he had agreed to the studio's scheme under which a publicity man is persuaded to pretend that it was really he who was driving what I am afraid we must call "the death car." Now, whenever the star gets restless, the studio threatens to expose him—though it is a little difficult to understand how it could do that without also exposing itself. And even if we are willing to assume, as apparently we are expected to do, that the drunken spree and refusal to take the consequences are somehow not the fault of the hero but the fault of Hollywood, it is still rather hard to see how a simple walking away would cost him anything except the millions which he professes to despise. At one point in the action he remarks, very sagely indeed, that "there is nothing so habit-forming as money"; and if Mr. Odets had not been so anxious to shift all the guilt from his hero to "the industry," he might have written a very interesting play on just that theme. Its moral would be that you cannot eat your cake if you insist on having it too. And that is the moral which, despite all the playwright's efforts to distract attention from it, keeps shouting itself out from almost every scene.

If Mr. Odets were not a man of considerable talent, the subject would hardly be worth discussing. But he is a man of considerable talent with a real gift for words, which he all too often misuses, and a real gift for writing effective scenes. As in the old days, he can still strike out a bitter wisecrack and still invent the seemingly irrelevant remark which, like the irrelevant remarks in his professed master, Chekhov, is not really irrelevant. He can also, as is here illustrated by the role of the movie magnate, well played by J. Edward Bromberg, sketch out a grand melodramatic villain. But the tendency to blame everything on some system or other be-

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comes obviously absurd when Hollywood and the California climate have become responsible for everything which he used to blame on capitalism. Even the doves are in a conspiracy against him, and when, at one curtain, the hero is expressing his exasperation by cooing into the telephone, one is tempted to protest: The fault, dear Brutus, is not in the bougainvillea or the mile-high malteses, but in ourselves, that we are thus and so.

At one point in the play our hero remarks that "when people say, 'Be yourself,' they don't really mean, 'Be like me.'" That is Odets at his best. But when, almost at the very end, this same hero utters his final complaint, "I have always wanted a world which would bring out the best in me," that is so completely Odets at his worst as to sound almost like satire. The desire for exculpation is all too plain. Something, alas, is always preventing Odets from being what he ought to be. Sometimes it is the Hollywood system; sometimes it is just "the system." And that makes it rather too much like a woman who might say, "I always wanted a world in which I could be chaste; but the men just *will* go on asking me."

Art

CLEMENT
GREENBERG

TO WHAT extent do taste and talent help and to what extent do they interfere with each other? This question, as far as American art is concerned, has been raised most conspicuously lately in sculpture, first by Alexander Calder and now by the accomplished and perhaps more serious Isamu Noguchi, who is having his first show in many years at the Egan Gallery (through April 2). The artist who deals with three dimensions is more easily hypnotized, it would seem, by his own facility than is the one confined to a flat surface—where that repetitiousness of rhythm which so often goes with excessive taste tends to be quicker to declare itself as the surrender to decorativeness that it usually is. Symmetry is not as disturbing in sculpture as it is in painting, and the object, symmetrical or not, does not lose itself in the décor as readily as

the picture—which, on the other hand, has the advantage of not becoming confused with the furniture. The element of tangibility also plays a part here. The eye, seeing a piece of sculpture, enjoys the triumph of human intention over resistant matter with more immediacy, and the artist is more tempted to rejoice in that triumph for its own sake alone.

In the case both of Calder and Noguchi the "modern" is treated as a convention with a closed canon of forms, derived in the main from Miró and Arp, the two School of Paris artists who have done most to rescue the emphasized contour from cubism. Noguchi's variations on the curved and straight line stay closer to traditional sculpture than does Calder's less somatic art, and his affinity is with Brancusi rather than the constructivists; he works with the remnants of volumes as well as with lines and planes, and in the more traditional material of stone. It is for this reason perhaps that Noguchi's taste makes itself even more noticeable—or, let me say, intrusive—than Calder's.

Noguchi machines and bevels his marble or slate into clean-shaped, glass-smooth plates, rods, and cusps which he fits together into compositions that adhere most often to the vertical scheme of the human figure. There is in general a geometric regularity in the exactness of shape and in the repetition of a limited set of ovals, curves, and straight lines. Sometimes, however, he works in bas-relief and manipulates his forms against the naked wall as a background—as in the black-slate "Open Window," one of the finest pieces of the show;

or he inserts knobs and rods into a flat slab of wood placed on the wall like a picture. Whatever affiliations some of Noguchi's pieces may still have with the statue, his art is, as we can see, fully in the midst of the adventure in genres that is modern advanced sculpture.

Several things in this show are exquisite—even when they measure five feet or more in height. But Noguchi's ability to achieve miniature grace on a large scale is the source precisely of some of the reservations this writer feels with respect to his art. Where is strength? Where are profundity and originality? Noguchi is an ambitious artist who asks to be judged on these terms. Few living artists, here or abroad, are capable of an equal felicity of effect; and given the ends he sets himself, he sometimes comes close to perfection. But these ends are not high enough, they are set within the reach of taste but require too little exertion on the part of talent; Noguchi reaches them by what seems too often a display merely of facility—a facility few can match, but facility none the less.

The stone Noguchi favors for his most ambitious efforts strikes me, also, as being inappropriate to his ideas, most of which seem to demand metal or wood. I would take as proof of this the greater success in this show of his one large piece in wood, the balsa "Cronos," which moved me as nothing else did, despite—or exactly because of—a lack of clarity in the relations of the horns and cusps that hang high up inside its arch. Another strength of "Cronos" is the rough finish of its surface,

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mezzo" and the Minuet of Lully from his "Le Bourgeois gentilhomme," in richly sonorous performances by the Royal Philharmonic under Beecham. And on still another (12-0734) are two of Strauss's songs, the saccharine "Morgen," and the less familiar "Befreit," which is considerably better. In "Morgen" Marian Anderson's singing is badly off pitch; in "Befreit" the voice is metallic and tremolo-ridden at first, but clear and rich at the climaxes. What, however, makes this performance something to listen to is the wonderful sustained continuity of Franz Rupp's playing of the piano part.

There are also a few Cetra-Soria singles to report on. First, Tajo's hammed-up performance—full of chuckles and the like—of the Catalogue Aria from "Don Giovanni" (2049, \$1.33). Then good performances by the bass Cesare Siepi of *Ella giammai m'amò* from "Don Carlos" (2068, \$1.84), and *O tu Palermo* from "I Vespri Siciliani" and *Son lo spirito che nega* from "Mefistofele" (2069, \$1.84). And finally some early Verdi: a so-so performance of the Overture to "Nabucco" by the Orchestra of Radio Italiana under Sergio Failoni (2067); choruses from "Nabucco" and "I Lombardi" sung by the Chorus of Radio Italiana under Ugo Tansini and Gino Marinuzzi (2064)—the climaxes distorted by the recording. I might add here that the accompaniments of all the Cetra-Soria performances are by the Orchestra of Radio Italiana under various Italian conductors.

And finally two Victor Heritage Series records (\$2.50 each), on which are issued here for the first time passages of "Boris Godunov" recorded during the July 4, 1928 performance in Covent Garden with Chaliapin. Record 15-1043 gives us Boris's scene with the Tsarevitch and the following Monologue; one side of 15-1044 has the Hallucination Scene, the other the beginning of Boris's Farewell, to the point where Victor record 15177 begins. There is some defective recording in the Hallucination Scene; there are, throughout, the long pauses of a real performance that were filled in with stage business; but there is also the sound of the stool being hurled at the ghost of Dimitri; and to anyone who saw and remembers Chaliapin's performance the records will be terrifically exciting.

"To the Youth of Latin America"

BY WALDO FRANK

[On January 14 the manifesto which follows appeared on the front page of *El Espectador*, the leading liberal newspaper in Bogotá, Colombia. Its author had just arrived in Bogotá from Venezuela, where he had observed at first hand the military counter-revolution of Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Delgado Chalbaud against the democratically elected regime of Rómulo Gallegos. The message received wide attention in the few Latin American republics which still have a free government. Mr. Frank has traveled and lectured in all the South American countries and written a number of books interpreting them for North American readers. He is now at work on a book on Simón Bolívar.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

THE November counter-revolution in Venezuela is the concern of every American. Its threat and its lesson to us all have an importance that carries beyond the frontiers of any republic. To judge it, one need not be an expert in the politics of Venezuela. Let us suppose, as the Venezuelan army claims, that the government of Venezuela, despite its superb program of social progress, was sectarian and inefficient. Let us even admit that certain officers of the army, after collaborating in the liberal revolution of 1945 which established constitutional rule and resulted in the election of Venezuela's first President by popular vote, sincerely believed it their national duty to throw that President out and start all over again. It is nevertheless true that the worst civil government is infinitely better than any military rule. It is also true that to remedy the defects of a civil government by a barracks putsch is to cure a disease by killing the patient. And it is above all true that an army, of all constituted groups, is the least well equipped to rule. Until these truths become self-evident from Mexico to Argentina, there is no hope for democracy in Latin America.

This is not to say that individual soldiers may not be admirably qualified to participate in government. Latin America's greatest statesman of the past fifty years is a soldier—General Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico. And he was one of the first publicly to express his horror at the recent act of the Venezuelan army.

The basic attitude of the military mind toward government and society was well expressed by Lieutenant Colonel M. Pérez Jimenez, true leader of the counter-revolution, who only recently is reported in the Caracas press to have said: "The same social equilibrium as that achieved in the armed forces is what we need for all the people of Venezuela." An army is an instrument of destruction and death. It is meant for nothing else, it is good for nothing else. As a tool for developing the subtle interplay of liberties, sensibilities, and imagination, of human trial and error, by which in a democracy men learn to grow and to live, an army is as efficient as a machete would be for nurturing a child or for creating a work of art.

But we liberals and radicals are far too prone to throw up our hands in virtuous horror at the military wave rising over Latin America, and to stop at that. We ought to collect our wits and with deep searching of heart and mind find out what we can do about it. The basic values of democracy, never realized by any nation, are threatened in the entire West. The danger is melodramatically present in Latin America and in Europe; but we of the United States know that we too are not exempt from it. No one, no nation, is safe.


But what can we do—we who have no tanks, no bombs? What, specifically, can the Latin American peoples do, who after the tragic trial and error of the whole nineteenth century seemed, with the Mexican revolution of 1910, at last to stand at a new dawn and now, midway in the twentieth century, find themselves in a new darkness?

First we must understand. . . . A democratic social order depends upon the stability, the harmony, the consciousness of the productive classes. These conditions of maturity exist in very few nations of Latin America; are not found in the industrial or agricultural workers, or in the professional groups, or in the bourgeoisie, which is more and more affected by powerful American interests. The result is endemic chaos; and in this chaos the army stands out as the one seemingly solid and stable power, although actually it is and can be merely the guardian and perpetuator of the existing chaos.

To indicate how this disastrous situa-

Crossword Puzzle No. 305

BY FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

- 1 The sap that's sometimes wild about diamonds? (5)
- 4 No charge for meals on the boat? (9)
- 9 Four against one in a new sort of role in the theater. (7)
- 10 and 4 down. Not the era of the gold-rush, but the stormy part of the Atlantic. (7, 7)
- 11 and 12. With such a bon-vivant are his innards misplaced? (4, 5)
- 13 Cross-word? (4)
- 16 Pulls out from our ston. (7)
- 17 Bound to be like a bridge? (7)
- 19 There's no use of my talking—you're out of it! (7)
- 22 To stamp on deck. (7)
- 24 Bails pickpockets? (4)
- 25 See 3 down.
- 26 Broken rood. (4)
- 29 The common American, in summer coat. (3, 4)
- 30 The bare gain of an apple. (7)
- 31 Predacious arthropod. (9)
- 32 With Alfred you can get either a negative or positive answer. (5)

DOWN

- 1 Reputedly over the hill. (9)
- 2 Pull it when someone shouts "Fire!" (7)
- 3, 14, and 25. The *Missouri Waltz* hasn't entirely replaced this in band repertoires! (4, 2, 3, 5)

4 See 10.

5 Eastern way of getting serious. (7)

6 There's a big one in the sky! (4)

7 Wrong time as I make friendships. (7)

8 Chief magistrates. (5)

14 See 3.

15 Such footwear should keep you dry! (5)

18 Shortened form of "deposes". (7)

20 Fast article goes into the Rappahan-

nock. (7)

21 and 23. Comes after Browning's

boot and saddle. (2, 5, 3, 4)

22 In *Intimations of Immortality* our

mortal nature did. (7)

23 See 21.

24 Column order. (5)

27 Boundary without measure for

fairies. (4)

28 Its gathering was an old Scotch

custom. (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 304

ACROSS:—1 CATACOMB; 5 PREFER; 9 PHOENIX; 10 CUPOLAS; 11 ENGLAND; 12 ORINOCO; 13 TENDERHEARTED; 15 EMBARRASSMENT; 21 EPITAPH; 22 ALBUMIN; 23 LIGHTER; 24 PRALINE; 25 DESERT; 26 FREE PORT.

DOWN:—1 COPPER; 2 THOUGHT; 3 CONTAIN; 4 MIXED METAPHOR; 6 REPLICAS; 7 FALL OUT; 8 RESPONDS; 10 CLOTHES HAMPER; 14 REBELLED; 16 BRIDGES; 17 REALTOR; 18 EMBRACE; 19 TAMPICO; 20 INVEST.

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ton can be met would require deep analysis and complex comment, for which I have no space here. But certain premises are obvious. The answer is not another army, not more violence, not the capture of the army by another authoritarian group, as has happened in Russia. The productive classes of the nation must be strengthened; and above all their relations one with another must be made closer. The students, the intellectuals, and the professionals must actively collaborate with the workers, industrial and agricultural. They must nourish one another. They must enhance their consciousness and their efficiency. They must learn to know their needs, in order to fight for them. They must know their enemies. And of all their enemies, the one closest to home is the army.

There must be a program which every productive man, woman, and child can understand—and love as the land is loved and the home. Here are a few of its indispensable items: (1) socialize the national wealth, expropriate the exploiters, national and foreign; (2) universalize the services of health and education; (3) build communications between the towns and the country, between the productive classes, and between the Latin American nations, possessors of one potential culture; (4) *abolish the army*, substituting for it modest national instruments of internal order, with the weapons of a mere police force.

These items go together. But let us consider the last one. Latin America needs no armies. And a constructive program of social and economic independence will always be hampered and threatened with instant death until its armies are gone. The world at large, indeed, had better get rid of its armies, if humanity is to survive. But whereas this is a fatally utopian proposal in nations like the United States and Soviet Russia, which think they must defend themselves against each other with gigantic armies, navies, and air forces, the nations of Latin America are more fortunate, for they must know that *their* armies cannot possibly defend them against an attack by giants. All their tanks and bombers are good for is to tempt the little Peróns and Duces who pullulate everywhere to take over, to absorb the wealth of the land and to stifle the spirit of the people.

Humanity takes a step forward only at those rare moments of history when a people—often a little people like the Greeks or the Jews—*dares* to take ad-

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vantage of its opportunities; dares to accept the challenge of its weakness. For instance: civil government grew in the United States during the nineteenth century because we were willing to remain militarily weak and to depend on the British navy to defend us against invasion by rival powers . . . and to devote all our energies to developing our natural resources. In the same way today, if the nations of Latin America are wise they will let the giants exhaust themselves with their lethal games and bravely devote themselves to winning and to populating their own lands. For this creative task Latin America has the spiritual and intellectual capacity. Has it the originality? Has it, above all, the courage?

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"Organize and socialize your lands and take them over at last! Deepen the relations between city and country, between technician and artist. Let your women learn the slogan: *Abolish the army!* Go to the workers in the fields and teach them the land is theirs. Go to the factory workers and teach them that the factories are theirs. And never let the people forget the slogan: *Abolish the army!*

"Then, and then only, will the day come when the recent events of Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, Salvador will be impossible forevermore. And the deep, creative energy of the Latin American peoples, now so often exiled to your folk songs and folk dances, will take over the social-economic body of your continent and make it great."

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